The European Union in Transition: The Treaty of Nice in Effect; Enlargement in Sight; A Constitution in Doubt by Goebel, Roger J.
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 27, Issue 2 2003 Article 1
The European Union in Transition: The Treaty
of Nice in Effect; Enlargement in Sight; A
Constitution in Doubt
Roger J. Goebel∗
∗
Copyright c©2003 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
The European Union in Transition: The Treaty
of Nice in Effect; Enlargement in Sight; A
Constitution in Doubt
Roger J. Goebel
Abstract
This Article is intended to provide an overview of this transitional moment in the history
of the European Union. Initially, the Article will briefly review the background of the Treaty
of Nice, and the institutional structure modifications for which it provides, which paves the way
for enlargement. Next it will describe the final stages of the enlargement process. Finally, the
Article will set out the principal institutional innovations and certain other key aspects of the draft
Constitution, the most important issues concerning them, and the current impasse.
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INTRODUCTION
Once again the European Union' (the "EU" or the
"Union") is in a stage of radical evolution. Since the early
1990's, the EU has anticipated an extraordinary increase in its
constituent Member States2 through the absorption of a large
number of Central European and Mediterranean nations. Since
the late 1990's, the Union has been negotiating the precise
terms for their entry with a dozen applicant nations and has
been providing cooperative assistance to them to prepare for
their accession to the Union and in particular, its principal con-
stituent part, the European Community.3 As this enlargement of
the Union came more clearly in sight, the political leadership
and the present Member States, joined by the Commission, con-
* Professor and Director of the Center on European Union Law, Fordham Univer-
sity School of Law.
1. The European Union (the "EU") was established by the Treaty on European
Union, adopted as part of the Treaty of Maastricht (signed Feb. 7, 1992; effective Nov.
1, 1993), O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinafter TEU]. The Euro-
pean Community constitutes the largest constituent part of the European Union, but
the EU also comprises the inter-governmental structures of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy and Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs. The three component
parts are commonly called the three "pillars" of the EU. The current consolidated text
of the TEU as amended appears in O.J. C 325/5 (Dec. 12, 2002).
2. The EU currently consists of fifteen Member States, the initial six that created
the European Economic Community in 1958 - Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Lux-
embourg, and the Netherlands - and the nine that have joined at later dates: Den-
mark, Ireland, and the U.K. in 1973, Greece in 1981, Portugal and Spain in 1986, and
Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995.
3. The European Community (or "EC"), originally designated as the European
Economic Community, was created by the Treaty of Rome, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (signed
March 25, 1957; effective January 1, 1958). With a structure of four institutions - the
European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, the Commission, and the Court ofJus-
tice - the European Community's original goal was to establish a common market, but
its sphere of operations has steadily expanded over its history. Article 3 of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty") sets forth its current sphere of
activities. The current consolidated text of the EC Treaty as amended appears in O.J. C
325/33 (Dec. 12, 2002).
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cluded that it was highly desirable, perhaps indispensable, to im-
prove the operational efficacy of its institutions.
In December 2000, the Member States agreed upon the
terms of the Treaty of Nice,4 which has just entered into force on
February 1, 2003, to make the modifications in the structure of
the Union's political and judicial institutions necessary to enable
the entry of the new States. The perception that the Nice Treaty
did not go far enough led Member States to the designation of a
special Convention in February 2002 to carry out a fundamental
re-examination of the basic concepts, structure, fields of action,
and procedures of the Union.' In June 2003, the Convention
submitted to the European Council in Thessolonica a new for-
mal text, a long and complex draft Constitution,6 to replace the
present Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing
the European Community.
Now, at the start of 2004, the enlargement of the EU will
soon become a reality, as ten new Member States join on May
1st, an event certain to alter profoundly the operational struc-
ture of the EU. The fate of the draft Constitution, however, is
very much in doubt, due to bitter disagreement among the
Member States' leadership over a key issue concerning the
power relationship between the largest and the smaller States in
the legislative and the decision-making process.7 While we may
hope that in 2004 the political leaders can continue their debate
in a sufficiently conciliatory manner to reach a satisfactory con-
4. The Treaty of Nice contains the most recent amendments to the TEU, supra
note 1, and the EC Treaty, supra note 3. Its text is at O.J. C 80/1 (Mar. 10, 2001). The
Treaty of Nice was signed on February 6, 2001, and became effective on February 1,
2003.
5. The European Council meeting at Laeken on December 14-15, 2001, decided to
convene the Convention, determined its basic membership, and assigned the principal
topics for consideration. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTTIES
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION - 2001, at 12-14 (2002) [hereinafter COMMISSION GENERAL
REPORT - 2001]. For a description of the European Council and its policy leadership
in the Union, see infra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
6. See Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, July 18, 2003, O.J. C
169/1 (2003) (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Draft Treaty].
7. The European Council meeting at Brussels on December 13-14, 2003 was una-
ble to reach agreement upon the issue of the mode of voting in the Council of Minis-
ters, an issue concerning the relative power of the largest versus the other States. See
George Parker, Muscle in Brussels: As Europe Meets to Agree a Constitution, Disputes Over the
Distribution of Power Loom Large, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2003, at 11; George Parker, Atmos-
phere of Resignation as Leaders Walk Away, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2003, at 4. For further
discussion, see infra Part III.
[Vol. 27:455
THE EUROPEAN UNION IN TRANSITION
clusion and thus enable the adoption of the draft Constitution,
this optimistic scenario is far from certain.
This Article is intended to provide an overview of this transi-
tional moment in the history of the European Union. Initially,
the Article will briefly review the background of the Treaty of
Nice, and the institutional structure modifications for which it
provides, which paves the way for enlargement. Next it will de-
scribe the final stages of the enlargement process. Finally, the
Article will set out the principal institutional innovations and
certain other key aspects of the draft Constitution, the most im-
portant issues concerning them, and the current impasse.
I. THE TREATY OF NICE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Constitutional Evolution Preceding the Treaty of Nice
In less than twenty years, four successive treaties have
marked the progressive constitutional and institutional evolution
of the European Union and its principal operational compo-
nent, the European Community. In order, these are the Single
European Act (or the "SEA"), signed on February 17, 1986 and
effective July 1, 1987;8 the Treaty of Maastricht, which created
the European Union and substantially modified the European
Community, signed on February 7, 1992, and effective Novem-
ber 1, 1993;' the Treaty of Amsterdam, signed on October 2,
1997, and effective May 1, 1999;'o and the Treaty of Nice, signed
on February 26, 2001, and effective February 1, 2003.11 Each
treaty represents the results of difficult negotiations among the
then Member States, meeting in an Intergovernmental Confer-
ence of their authorized representatives, in accord with the
amendment process set out in the successive treaties. 12 Each
8. O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [19871 2 C.M.L.R. 741.
9. See supra note 1. The Treaty of Maastricht was also published by the Commis-
sion Office for Official Publications, Treaty on European Union (1992).
10. The Treaty of Amsterdam amended both the TEU and the EC Treaty. The
text of each consolidated form after the Treaty of Amsterdam is in OJ. C 340/1 (Nov.
10 1997). See Roger Goebel, The Treaty of Amsterdam in Historical Perspective: Introduction
to the Symposium, 22 FOROHAM INT'L LJ. 7 (1999) (commencing a symposium issue de-
voted to Articles analyzing aspects of the Treaty of Amsterdam).
11. See supra note 4.
12. Article 236 of the initial EC Treaty, supra note 3, provided that the Council
could call a "conference of the representatives of the Member States ... for the purpose
of determining by common accord the amendments to be made to the Treaty." Id. The
Treaty of Maastricht, supra note 1, moved this text from the EC Treaty to Article N of
2004]
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treaty marks a substantial step forward toward greater union, op-
erational efficiency and democratic legitimacy, as well as a signif-
icant expansion of the fields of action. However, each treaty has
left unresolved significant issues, setting the stage for a subse-
quent re-examination in another treaty revision.
The definite historical landmark launching this process is
the Solemn Declaration on European Union adopted by the Eu-
ropean Council at Stuttgart inJune 1983.13 As is well known, the
European Council is the body composed of the Heads of State or
government of each Member State which has met three or four
times a year since the early 1970s in order to provide the "gen-
eral political guidelines" for the European Community (and
since 1993 for the European Union).14 The Stuttgart Declara-
tion expresses the leaders' commitment "to achieve a compre-
hensive and coherent common political approach" to the goal of
"European Union."15 Virtually at the same time, in February
1984, the Parliament endorsed the text of a Draft Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Union, intended to launch a public debate
on the future constitutional evolution of the European Commu-
nity. 16
It would take too long to trace the developmental threads of
the 1980s and 1990s that produced the successive treaty changes,
but certainly three should be noted: the success of the internal
market program, the impetus to achieve greater democratic le-
gitimacy, and the on-going process of addition of new Member
States.
the TEU, substituting "Treaty on which the Union is founded" for "Treaty." The Am-
sterdam Treaty, supra note 10, renumbered N as Article 48.
13. 16 E.C. BULL., no. 6, at 18-29 (1983).
14. A summit meeting of the then Member State leaders at Paris in December
1974 decided to hold regular meetings designated as the European Council three times
annually (more recently, four times). The SEA, supra note 8, introduced the status and
role of the European Council in Treaty language. The Treaty of Maastricht inserted
Article D (now 4) into the TEU, supra note 1, declaring that the European Council shall
"provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define the
general political guidelines thereof." Id. Historically, the European Council has taken
the most important decisions of policy and principle for the European Union and the
European Community, but technically it cannot adopt legally binding measures. (In
Part III, we discuss Article 1-20 of the draft Constitution which would give the European
Council that power). See DESMOND DINAN, EVER CLOSER UNION 248-54 (2d ed. 1999)
(describing the origin and present role of the European Council). See also GEORGE BER-
MANN ET AL, EUROPEAN UNION LAw 40-42 (2d ed. 2002).
15. See 16 E.C. BULL., supra note 13, at 24.
16. O.J. C 77/33 (Feb. 14, 1984).
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The internal market program, launched by the Commis-
sion's famous White Paper on Completing the Internal Market
in June 1985," 7 and endorsed by the European Council at Milan
that month,1 8 proved an enormous success. The White Paper
called for the removal of barriers to the free movement of goods,
persons, services, and capital through the enactment of legisla-
tion harmonizing Member State regulations in order to achieve
a Community wide marketplace. The desire to achieve the inter-
nal market program undoubtedly catalyzed the decision of the
political leaders of the Member States to call the first Intergov-
ernmental Conference ("IGC") in Luxembourg in fall 1985.19
This IGC drafted the Single European Act, whose adoption in
1987 gave treaty force to the goal of completing the internal
market program by December 31, 1992.20 The SEA greatly facili-
tated the legislative procedures for enacting internal market leg-
islation, substituting the Qualified Majority Voting (or "QMV")
system in the Council for the prior requirement of unanimous
Council action,2 1 and requiring the active participation of the
Parliament through the so-called legislative cooperation proce-
dure. 22  Under the dynamic leadership of Commission Presi-
dent Jacques Delors, and the Internal Market Commissioner,
Lord Cockfield, and with the enthusiastic support of the Council
and the Parliament, the legislative program set out in the White
17. See Commission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Mar-
ket: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM (85) 310 Final
(June 1985). The Commission Office of Official Publications also published the White
Paper in 1985.
18. 18 E.C. BULL., no. 6, at 14-15 (1985).
19. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, NINETEENTH GENERAL REPORT TO THE ACTMTIES OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES - 1985, at 29-34 (1986). See also DINAN, supra note 14, at
116-20 (describing the work of the Luxembourg IGC).
20. Introduced as EC Treaty Article 8a by the SEA, this provision is now EC Treaty
Article 14, supra note 3. The then-head of the Commission Legal Service, Claus-Dieter
Ehlermann, analyzes the SEA in The Internal Market Following the Single European Act, 24
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 361 (1987); the then-head of the Council Legal Service, Hans-
Joachim Glaesner does so in The Single European Act: Attempt at an Appraisal, 10 FOR-
HAM INT'L LJ. 446 (1987).
21. Introduced as EC Treaty Article 100a by the SEA, this Provision is now EC
Treaty Article 95, supra note 3.
22. The cooperation procedure, initially in EC Treaty Article 149, survives in the
current EC Treaty Article 252, supra note 3, but is now only employed occasionally for
some decisions in the Economic and Monetary Union. Essentially, the procedure ena-
bled the Parliament to propose amendments which the Council could accept by a Qual-
ified Majority Vote, but could only reject by unanimous action. See BERMANN, supra
note 14, at 86-87.
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Paper was almost entirely attained by its scheduled deadline of
December 31, 1992.23
The legislative and economic success of the internal market
program then inspired the political leadership of the Member
States to move forward at the start of the 1990s in a second Inter-
governmental Conference 4 which produced the Maastricht
Treaty, comprising the new Treaty on European Union and a
radically revised European Community Treaty. The Treaty of
Maastricht provided the European Community with major new
initiatives25 (most notably, creating the Economic and Monetary
Union, 26 but also inspiring further action in the fields of social
policy, environmental protection, and transportation). Subse-
quently, the later Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice have each
augmented the fields of action of the Community.
The natural desire to facilitate the easier adoption of legisla-
tive measures led to a steady increase, treaty by treaty, in the leg-
islative fields in which the traditional Community system of ma-
jority voting (the Qualified Majority Voting) could be used by
the Council of Ministers, instead of requiring unanimous ac-
tion.27 Moreover, ever since the mid-1980's, steady pressure
23. See LORD COCKFIELD, THE EUROPEAN UNION: CREATING THE SINGLE MARKET
(1994) (describing the background and the success of the internal market program).
See also BERMANN, supra note 14, at 544-47 (describing the program's success).
24. The European Council session at Dublin in June 1990 called for two IGCs, one
to work on political aspects, the other to prepare for an economic and monetary union,
to be held from December 1990 to December 1991. See 23 E.C. BULL., no. 6, at 7-10
(1990). See also DINAN, supra note 14, at 127-48 (describing the background and the
difficult debates during the IGC).
25. The literature on the Treaty of Maastricht is voluminous. Excellent surveys
are: INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (Deidre Curtin et al. eds.,
1994); LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY (David O'Keeffe & Patrick Twomey
eds., 1994).
26. The EC Treaty provisions governing Economic and Monetary Union ("EMU")
are set out in Articles 98-130 (initially numbered as 102a-109s by the Treaty of Maas-
tricht). For a detailed analysis of these provisions and the evolution to EMU, see RENE
SMITS, THE EUROPEAN CErNTRAL BANK: INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS (1997); Roger Goebel,
European Economic and Monetary Union - Will the EMU Ever Fy, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 249
(1998).
27. The Council's Qualified Majority Voting system gives each Member State a
weighted vote somewhat proportionate to its population and economic importance,
and then sets a figure roughly corresponding to 70% of the total weighted votes for the
adoption of measures. The system set in EC Treaty Article 205 prior to the Nice Treaty
gave Luxembourg two votes, while France, Germany, Italy, and the U.K. each received
ten votes, and the other States had weighted votes in between. QMV voting was only
occasionally used until the SEA enabled the Council to enact most internal market
legislation through this mode.
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from the Parliament, joined by popular support for an enhanced
degree of democratic legitimacy for Community legislation, has
produced a radically augmented participation of the Parliament
in the legislative process. Prior to the Single European Act, the
Parliament was only "consulted" by the Council in the legislative
process, and the Parliament's proposed amendments could be
ignored (although as a matter of fact they often influenced the
Council to amend the draft text). The Single European Act gave
the Parliament a mechanism for pressuring the Council to adopt
legislative amendments in the legislative cooperation procedure,
applicable for most internal market legislation.2' The Maas-
tricht Treaty substantially upgraded this to co-decision, 29 a legis-
lative procedure in which the Parliament achieved virtual equal-
ity with the Council in the adoption of internal market legisla-
tion. ° The Treaty of Amsterdam then modified the co-decision
procedure to give Parliament a complete veto power, and thus
an equal role with the Council in the legislative process, 31 as well
as expanding the fields in which co-decision was to be used.
Moreover, the treaties, beginning with that of Maastricht,
have steadily augmented the participation of the Parliament in
the designation of the Commission and its President. Thus, by
virtue of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Parliament must first ap-
prove the Member States' nominee for the Commission Presi-
28. See supra note 22.
29. The Treaty of Maastricht introduced the co-decision procedure in EC Treaty
Article 189b. In its initial form, both the Council and the Parliament review legislative
proposals twice, in a complex interplay of review of proposed amendments. If the two
institutions are unable to agree on a text, they can resort to a Conciliation Committee
composed of representatives from each body. Usually, both institutions must approve
any compromise text suggested by a Conciliation Committee, but if this does not hap-
pen, then the Council has a final opportunity to adopt the version it prefers by a Quali-
fied Majority Vote, unless the Parliament is able to reject the Council text by an unusu-
ally high vote, an absolute majority of all of the MEPs. For a discussion of legislative
procedures after the Treaty of Maastricht, see Alan Dashwood, Community Legislative
Procedures in the Era of the Treaty on European Union, 19 EUR. L. REv. 343 (1994).
30. The Treaty of Maastricht amended EC Treaty Article 100a (now numbered as
Article 95) to enable most internal market legislation to be adopted by the co-decision
procedure.
31. See EC Treaty Article 252 following the Treaty of Amsterdam, which eliminates
the prior possibility for the Council to adopt a proposal following the rejection by ei-
ther body of a compromise text endorsed by a Conciliation Committee. For a current
description of the co-decision procedure, see BERMANN, supra note 14, at 97-100. See
also Jean-Claude Piris & Giorgio Maganza, The Amsterdam Treaty: Overview and Institu-
tional Aspects, 22 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. S32, S43 (1999).
2004]
462 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
dent, and then collectively approve the nominees for all the
members of the Commission.32 Additionally, the Parliament
has in recent years significantly increased its monitoring and su-
pervision of the Commission's conduct of its affairs.
The success of the internal market program has worked as a
magnet, drawing neighboring nations to seek to join the Union.
This in turn meant that the political leadership of the Union,
both in the Commission and in the Member States, was keenly
aware that the Union's institutional structure and operations
needed to be revised before feeling the strain produced by the
admission of new Member States. Already some of the restruc-
turing in the Maastricht Treaty was due to the then Member
States' desire to achieve a more functional operational structure
and to expand the fields of action in a "deepening" process
before the "widening" to add Austria, Finland, Sweden, and ulti-
mately the Central European applicants.33 Thus, the Maastricht
Treaty notably added Economic and Monetary Union as an inte-
gral component of the European Community, and created the
over-arching structure of the European Union in order to ac-
commodate intensified inter-governmental cooperation and
joint action in the sectors of Common Foreign and Security Pol-
icy ("CFSP") and Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs
("CJHA"). 34 When in the late 1990's, the Member States felt that
the partial success of the initial policies and joint actions in the
field of CJHA merited an intensification of its operating proce-
dures, the Treaty of Amsterdam shifted the sectors of visas, asy-
lum rights, and immigration from inter-governmental coopera-
tive measures to the Community's legislative procedures, albeit
with some limiting provisions. 5
32. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 214. The Treaty of Maastricht had already
required that Parliament must approve the nominees for the Commission as a whole,
starting with the 1995-99 Commission. Id. art. 158 (now renumbered as 214).
33. See Roger Goebel, The European Union Grows: The Constitutional Impact of the
Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, 18 FoRDA-m INT'L L.J. 1092, at 1108-09 (1995)
[hereinafter The European Union Grows].
34. The TEU provisions on CFSP are in Articles 11-28 (initially designated asJ.1 to
J.18). The original provisions on CJHA were in Articles K.1 to K-9. The current, sub-
stantially modified provisions are in Articles 29-42.
35. EC Treaty Articles 61-69, introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam. For an anal-
ysis of these complex procedures, see Sally Langrish, The Treaty of Amsterdam: Selected
Highlights, 23 EUR. L. REv. 3, 7-12 (1998).
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B. The Treaty of Nice
The prospect of the largest enlargement to date, that of ten
(and ultimately more) Central European and Mediterranean na-
tions, virtually dictated the holding of another Intergovernmen-
tal Conference in 2000 and the adoption of the Treaty of Nice.36
Although the Treaty of Nice does have some provisions relating
to substantive fields of action, its raison d'etre is essentially to
modify the institutional framework of the Union in order to ac-
commodate the numerous new Member States. In particular,
the Union's political leadership sought to maintain, and perhaps
even to augment, the operational efficiency of its political and
judicial institutions. The process of reaching agreement on the
more controversial issues proved arduous indeed during the In-
tergovernmental Conference, which was obliged to submit sev-
eral of the most difficult issues to the European Council at Nice
on December 7-8, 2000.17 Media accounts indicate that the dis-
cussion among the assembled Heads of State or Government
proved unusually acrimonious. Although compromises were
reached to permit the Treaty's signature on February 26, 2001, it
was felt that the Treaty of Nice would only be a stop-gap solution
- a more far reaching re-examination of the Union and its insti-
tutions would be necessary. Indeed, a Declaration on the Future
of the Union, annexed to the Treaty of Nice, called for "a
deeper and wider debate about the future of the European
Union" to commence in 2001, leading ultimately to a new IGC.
The entry into effect of the Treaty of Nice was unfortunately
delayed. Although easily ratified by the parliaments of all the
other Member States,3" Ireland was constrained by its constitu-
36. Annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam is a Protocol on the Institutions with the
Prospect of Enlargement of the EU, O.J. C 340/11 (1997), which mandates another
IGC at least one year before the next enlargement and sets as topics the size and mem-
bership of the Commission and the voting system in the Council. See Piris & Manganza,
supra note 31, at S41-S42. The European Council held at Helsinki on December 10-11,
1999, decided to call an IGC in February 2000 for this purpose.
37. During the IGC, the Commission issued several reports and the Parliament
adopted several resolutions intended to influence the discussions. See EUROPEAN COM-
MISSION, GENERAL REPORT ON THE AcTrVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION - 2000, at 7-11
(2001), available at http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/rg/en/2000/index.htm
[hereinafter COMMISSION GENERAL REPORT - 2000]. The Commission specifically re-
ferred to "10 months of intense negotiations." Id. at 11. The General Report also sum-
marizes the Nice Treaty institutional provisions. Id. at 12-13.
38. See COMMISSION GENERAL REPORT - 2001, supra note 5, at 8.
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tion to hold a referendum. In its initial referendum in June
2001, a narrow 54% majority of the votes were negative, a result
probably due largely to a general sense of dissatisfaction with the
European Union and with the current Irish government, rather
than a specific disapproval of the Treaty text. Fortunately a vig-
orous effort by Prime Minister Ahern and almost all Irish politi-
cal groups achieved a highly satisfactory 63% affirmative vote in
the second referendum on October 19, 2002. 9 In accordance
with its provisions, the Treaty of Nice entered into effect two
months later, on February 1, 2003.
Annexed to the Treaty of Nice is a Protocol on the Enlarge-
ment of the European Union,4 ° which has binding force, and a
Declaration on the Enlargement of the European Union,41
which is effectively a statement of intent concerning the proba-
ble number of weighted votes in the Council and of Members of
the European Parliament assigned to each applicant nation.
The most important provisions of the Treaty of Nice and the
Protocol on Enlargement modified the Union's political and ju-
dicial institutions in a fashion to enable the integration of a
dozen or more applicant nations into the structure of the Euro-
pean Union. Some of these provisions became effective on Feb-
ruary 1, 2003, while others will enter into effect in 2004 or on
January 1, 2005 after the new Member States join, in accordance
with the specific terms of the Nice Protocol on the Enlargement.
Obviously, the principal issue raised by the admission of so
many new States at one time is how to increase the membership
of each of the institutions without a concomitant sacrifice of effi-
ciency. An important secondary issue is that of democratic legiti-
macy - to what proportion of each institution's membership
should each new Member State be entitled in light of its popula-
tion and the size of its economy. Although parallel concerns
arose in prior enlargements, in each the increase in membership
was much more incremental in character - Denmark, Ireland,
and the U.K. in 1973, Greece in 1981, Portugal and Spain in
1986, and Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995. This time the
membership of the Commission, the Council of Ministers, and
39. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EURO-
PEAN UNION - 2002, at 9 (2003), available at http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/
rg/en/2002/index.htm [hereinafter COMMISSION GENERAL REPORT-2002].
40. O.J. C 80/1, at 49 (Mar. 3, 2001).
41. O.J.C 80/1, at 80 (Mar. 3, 2001).
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the Courts might conceivably nearly double in size, while the
Parliament's membership would certainly increase substantially
unless the delegations of the present Member States decrease in
number. The challenge for the 2000 Intergovernmental Confer-
ence was how to provide functional solutions, compatible with
operational efficiency and democratic legitimacy, to the adapta-
tion of each institution to the enlargement of the Union. With
this in mind, we turn now to the institutional provisions of the
Treaty of Nice and its Protocol on Enlargement.
Determining the maximum size of an already large Parlia-
ment did not in fact prove so divisive an issue. Although each
Member State is allocated a number of Members ("MEPs") in
some proportion to its population, the larger States have always
rather generously claimed fewer MEPs than a strict census calcu-
lation would warrant. National membership in the Parliament is
by no means calculated as closely in function of population as is
State representation in the U.S. House of Representatives.
After the accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden on Janu-
ary 1, 1995, Parliament's size was increased to a total of 626
MEPs.4 2 Germany presently has ninety-nine MEPs, France, Italy,
and the U.K. eighty-seven each, Spain sixty-four, with the other
Member States having lesser numbers down to fifteen for Ire-
land, and six for Luxembourg. The Treaty of Nice's new
formula for the Parliament's composition will apply when the
next European Parliament is elected in June 2004. Its member-
ship will increase to 732.4" The delegations of the current Mem-
ber States will decrease in size in order to make room for the ten
applicant nations that will enter the Union on May 1, 2004. Be-
cause Bulgaria and Romania will not join this year, the seats of
the fifty MEPs initially foreseen in the Declaration on Enlarge-
ment for those nations have been allocated among the present
Member States and the applicants in order to fill up to the Par-
liament's ceiling of 732 MEPs. The precise numbers are now
fixed in the Treaty of Athens of April 16, 2003, 44 whose Act of
Accession governs the admission of the new States.45 Thus, Ger-
42. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 190 (before the Treaty of Nice; renumbered
from Article 138 by the Treaty of Amsterdam).
43. EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 189 (after the Treaty of Nice; the Treaty of Am-
sterdam had set a ceiling of 700 MEPs, but this was never operational).
44. O.J. C 236/17 (Sept. 23, 2003).
45. O.J. C 236/33 (Sept. 23, 2003).
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many will elect ninety-nine MEPs, France, Italy, and the U.K. sev-
enty-eight each, Poland and Spain fifty-four each, the Nether-
lands twenty-seven, Belgium, the Czech Republic, and Hungary
twenty-four each, and so on down to six for Luxembourg and
five for Malta. 46 This allocation of MEP seats among the States
has not provoked any significant dissention or controversy. As
we shall see, the draft Constitution would not immediately
change this, although it calls for the European Council to reex-
amine later the allocation formula.
The future size of the Commission has provoked considera-
ble and ongoing debate. The Protocol on the Enlargement pro-
vides that the first Commission taking office after January 1,
2005 will have "one national of each of the Member States. 4 7
Although not expressly stated, the intention is to eliminate the
second Commissioner traditionally accorded to the five largest
Member States - France, Italy, Germany, Spain, and the U.K.48
The Protocol further indicates that when the Union shall consist
of twenty-seven Member States (presumably when Bulgaria and
Romania join), then the Council shall reduce the size of the
Commission, instituting a system of equal rotation of Commis-
sioners among the then Member States. The Protocol has the
effect of permitting the Commission membership to increase to
twenty-five or more in the short-term, which may somewhat re-
duce its collegiate operational efficiency, but looks long-term to
a smaller Commission. The Treaty of Athens' Act of Accession
follows through on this approach by specifying that the ten new
States are each allocated a transitional Commissioner for May 1
- October 31, 2004, and that the new Commission commencing
on November 1, 2004 is to consist of one national of each Mem-
ber State, i.e., twenty-five in all. 49 As we shall see, the draft Con-
stitution provides for a Commission of fifteen members, selected
46. Act of Accession, supra note 45, art. 11.
47. Protocol on Enlargement, supra note 40, art. 4, O.J. C 80/49, at 51. The Proto-
col also states that the Council may fix the total number of Commission members by
unanimous action. Id.
48. In the Commission of the initial European Economic Community, France,
Germany, and Italy received two Commissioners. When the U.K. and Spain subse-
quently acceded to the Community, they also received two Commissioners. However,
this has never been expressly stated in the Treaty. The present EC Treaty Article 213
merely states that the "Commission shall consist of 20 members."
49. Act of Accession, supra note 45, art. 45.
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through an equal rotation system - one of its most controversial
provisions.
The Treaty of Nice inserts a new Article 217 into the EC
Treaty, substantially augmenting the powers of the Commission
President. The Treaty of Amsterdam had already declared that
the Commission works "under the political guidance of its Presi-
dent."5 ° The Nice Treaty empowers the President to unilaterally
determine the "internal organization" of the Commission, allo-
cating and reshuffling portfolios and tasks among the Commis-
sioners.51 Indeed, the President may even demand the resigna-
tion of a Commissioner, provided the entire Commission gives
its assent.5 2 There has been a growing consensus among the
Member States that the President of the Commission should
have enhanced authority over the other Commissioners and the
entire civil service of the Commission. The Nice Treaty reflects
this view and the draft Constitution text goes even further in
augmenting the power of the Commission President.
The Nice Treaty makes a final useful change in the process
of selecting a Commission. Until now, the Member State govern-
ments have selected the President and Commission members by
common accord (with the approval of the Parliament since the
Treaty of Amsterdam, as noted above). The Nice Treaty's re-
vised EC Treaty Article 214 provides that the Council shall select
the President and the Commission members by a Qualified Ma-
jority Vote, thus ending the risk of any State's veto of a prospec-
tive nominee.53
50. EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 219 (introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam,
moved to Article 217 by the Treaty of Nice).
51. EC Treaty Article 217 (1) and (2), as amended by the Treaty of Nice. The
Treaty of Amsterdam had annexed a Declaration on the Organization of the Commis-
sion which made the same statement, but a Declaration does not have binding legal
effect.
52. Id. at (4). Commission President Santer may well have wished that he had this
power when dealing with evidence of mal-administration and favoritism on the part of
other Commissioners in late 1998 and early 1999. See Rent Barents, Some Observations
on the Treaty of Nice, 8 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. L. 121, at 124-25 (2001).
53. EC Treaty Article 214 (2), as amended by the Treaty of Nice. For the nomina-
tion of the Commission President, the Council must act by a Qualified Majority Vote of
the Heads of State or Government, reflecting the weight given to the office. In 1994,
before the Luxembourg Prime Minister Santer was ultimately nominated to become
Commission President, media reports suggested that Prime Minister Debaene of
Belgium and Prime Minister Lubbers of the Netherlands had each been vetoed as can-
didates by certain Member States.
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Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the Treaty of Nice
is its modification of the system of Qualified Majority Voting in
the Council, which is used for most internal market legislation
and in many other fields as well. The Protocol on the Enlarge-
ment modifies the number of weighted votes given to each State
in order to take account of those being allocated to those join-
ing, as indicated in the Declaration on Enlargement. Notably,
the four largest States - Germany, France, Italy, and the U.K. -
are each assigned twenty-nine votes out of a total number of 321
weighted votes,5 4 i.e., about 9% each. Spain receives twenty-
seven, as does Poland by virtue of the Declaration,55 despite the
fact that their population is less than half that of Germany, and
only two-thirds that of France, Italy, and the U.K.. The Protocol
requires that a majority of Member States must support a pro-
posed legislative measure or decision, and then sets the requisite
number of weighted votes needed to adopt it. The Treaty of
Athens' Act of Accession slightly modified this requisite num-
ber, because Bulgaria and Romania are not joining. The num-
ber required for approval of a proposed measure is 232 weighted
votes, approximately 72% of the 321 total weighted votes.56 Both
the Protocol and the Act of Accession then add the so-called
triple majority provision: upon request for a verification from
any Member State, a proposed measure will not be considered
adopted if those States voting in favor do not represent at least
62% of the total population of the Union. This final qualifica-
tion, which obviously serves to protect the interests of the more
populous States, was one of the critical compromises that ena-
bled the Member States to agree upon the Treaty of Nice.
The Protocol system of Qualified Majority Voting in the
Council goes into effect onJanuary 1, 2005. (The Treaty of Ath-
ens sets out a transitional regime for QMV between May 1 and
December 31, 2004)." Although the calculations of voting in
the Council under this new QMV system appear at first glance to
54. Protocol on Enlargement, supra note 40, art. 3.
55. Declaration on Enlargement, supra note 41. It is worth noting that Cyprus,
Estonia, Latvia, and Slovenia each receive the same four weighted votes as does Luxem-
bourg, while Malta obtains three. The other Member States' votes range from thirteen
for the Netherlands down to seven for Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania, and
Slovakia.
56. Act of Accession, supra note 45, art. 12.
57. Id. art. 26.
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be quite complicated, a realistic appraisal is that the system is apt
to work quite well in practice, even if it does somewhat enhance
the voting power of medium-sized and smaller States at the ex-
pense of Germany, France, Italy, and the U.K. As the eminent
political scientist, Wolfgang Wessels accurately has observed:
"Legal provisions do not determine voting behavior ... Coun-
tries are not always in the same coalition of outvoted minori-
ties.""8 Generally speaking, the Council strives to reach a con-
sensus or a near consensus. When split votes in the Council do
occur, one rarely finds a division of large States versus small
States - close divisions more often occur on somewhat of a po-
litical basis (e.g., conservative governments versus socialist or lib-
eral ones), on an economic basis (e.g., States with substantial
agricultural production versus States with relatively minor agri-
cultural sectors), or on a geographical basis (e.g., North-South
divisions on environmental protection proposals).
The Treaty of Nice makes relatively uncontroversial but ex-
tremely helpful modifications to the structure and operations of
the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance. Both courts
will continue to consist of one judge per Member State, a cus-
tomary approach that now has been given Treaty force in EC
Treaty Articles 221 and 224."9 On May 1, 2004, the two courts
will increase in size from fifteen to twenty-five judges (with the
likely addition of several more judges in the medium term, as
additional States join the EU), potentially posing a risk of re-
duced efficiency in decision-making. (Nonetheless, there was
never any serious question in the IGC of the principle that a
State should be represented by a judge on each court). The
Treaty of Nice does not however increase the number of Advo-
cates General in the Court of Justice beyond the present eight,
although EC Treaty Article 222 authorizes the Council to do so
58. Wolfgang Wessels, Nice Results: The Millennium IGC in the EUs Evolution, 39 J.
COMMON MKT. STUD. 197, 206 (2001).
59. The Nice Treaty amended EC Treaty Article 221 to state that the "Court of
Justice shall consist of one judge per Member State," replacing text calling for "15
Judges" without expressly requiring one judge per State. The Nice Treaty likewise
amended EC Treaty Article 224 (ex Article 225) to state that the "Council of First In-
stance shall comprise at least one judge per Member State" - the prior text made no
express reference to the number ofjudges or their selection from each State. The "at
least" qualification will enable the CFI to have additional judges should its caseload
warrant this.
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by unanimous action.6 °
The modifications produced by the Nice Treaty are in-
tended to promote the functional efficiency of the two courts
despite their much larger membership. The Nice Treaty amend-
ments are largely based on recommendations emanating from a
working group chaired by former Court of Justice President, Ole
Due, which presented to the Commission in February .2000 an
influential report, "The Future of the Judicial System of the Eu-
ropean Union."6 The two Courts largely endorsed these recom-
mendations in a "document de reflexion" presented to the
IGC.62
Perhaps the single most functional modification made by
the Nice Treaty is that both courts may refer virtually any case
for decision to a Grand Chamber, initially composed of eleven
judges.63 This Grand Chamber is far larger and more representa-
tive than the present chambers or panels of three or five judges,
yet smaller than the full court. A Grand Chamber is apt to be
used frequently, because a Member State or an institution which
is a party to a proceeding may require its use in the proceeding,
and the Court itself may resort to a Grand Chamber for impor-
tant cases. 6 4 Plenary, or full Court, proceedings may become rel-
atively rare, because they are now only mandated by the Treaty
in exceptional cases" and because they may be regarded as cum-
60. EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 222, as amended by the Treaty of Nice.
61. The former Danish Judge, Ole Due, served on the Court of Justice between
1978 and 1994 the last six years as its President. The working group report was appar-
ently not published. The Commission largely followed its suggestions in its own recom-
mendations concerning the judicial system to the IGC on March 1, 2000. See COMMIs-
SION GENERAL REPORT - 2000, supra note 37, at 9.
62. See Bo Vesterdorf, The Community Court System Ten Years from Now and Beyond:
Challenges and Possibilities, 28 EUR. L. REV. 303, at 311 (2003). Judge Vesterdorf, current
President of the CFI, provides an excellent description of the operational evolution of
the two Courts, the effects of the Treaty of Nice, and future challenges.
63. EC Treaty Article 221, as amended by the Treaty of Nice, authorizes the Court
of Justice to sit in a Grand Chamber, whose membership shall be fixed by the Court's
Statute. In the Nice Protocol which sets out the current Statute, Article 16 makes the
Grand Chamber consist of eleven Judges, chaired by the President. EC Treaty Article
224, as amended by the Treaty of Nice, enables the CFI also to make use of Grand
Chamber.
64. Article 16 of the Nice Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice.
65. Id. In view of this, the eminent Dutch formerJudge Paul Kapteyn worries that
the Grand Chamber may not be sufficiently representative of a 25 (or more) member
Court, and that Judges not sitting in the Grand Chamber may become "second-class
judges." He suggests a larger Grand Chamber of fifteen judges, rotated regularly. Paul
Kapteyn, Reflections on the Future of the Judicial System of the European Union after Nice, in 20
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bersome in practice.
Another very practical change is that each Court can now
set its Rules of Procedure, subject to approval by a Council quali-
fied majority vote,6 6 instead of by the prior requirement of unan-
imous Council action, which thus promotes flexibility in future
Court innovations in operations.
Through an amendment to EC Treaty Article 225, the Nice
Treaty empowers the Council to amend the Courts' Statutes to
transfer some of the fields of law giving rise to preliminary refer-
ences or questions from the Court ofJustice to the Court of First
Instance.6" Although such a transfer would certainly reduce the
heavy caseload of the Court of Justice (especially if the new
Member States' courts frequently refer questions), it creates the
risk of a variation between the judicial rulings of the two courts.
To reduce this risk, Article 225 permits the Court of First In-
stance to transfer a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice
if the answer might require "a decision of principle likely to af-
fect the unity or consistency of Community law," and further au-
thorizes appeals of CFI reference decisions "exceptionally . . .
where there is a serious risk [to] the unity or consistency of Com-
munity law." CFI President Vesterdorf endorses the transfer of
some references to the CFI, citing the present burden on the
Court of Justice produced by "essentially technical cases" and
hopes that it will be decided upon soon by the Council.6" The
Council is currently reviewing the subject. Presumably if the
Council decides to exercise its power to transfer references in
certain fields to the Court of First Instance, the Council will try
to devise more precise procedures to reduce any risk of diver-
gence in important doctrines between the two Courts.
The Nice Treaty also introduces a new EC Treaty Article
225a to improve the efficiency of the Court of First Instance by
granting the Council the power to create judicial panels
Y.B. OF EUR. L., at 187-88 (Piet Eeckhout & Takis Tridimas, eds., 2001). Angus John-
ston, Judicial Reform and the Treaty of Nice, 38 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 499, 512 (2001)
offers a contrasting view: the Grand Chamber approach increases "the Court's capacity
to handle its case load, while maintaining as much collegiality in discussions and delib-
eration as possible."
66. EC Treaty Articles 223 and 224, as amended by the Treaty of Nice.
67. EC Treaty Article 225, as amended by the Treaty of Nice.
68. Vesterdorf, supra note 62, at 314. In contrast, formerJudge Kapteyn expresses
considerable concern about the mode and efficiency of a procedure for review by the
Court of Justice of CFI reference decisions. See Kapteyn, supra note 65, at 180-82.
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subordinate to the CFI, with a right of appeal.69 Ajudicial panel
to deal with civil servant staff cases appears to be quite likely, and
one to deal with trademarks is also being discussed.
One issue not seriously examined by the IGC was that of
selection of Judges, which by tradition is essentially left to the
discretion of each Member State for its own Judges or Advocate
General. Former Judge Kapteyn views this approach as unsatis-
factory, not ensuring judicial quality or impartiality, and suggests
a review of nominees' credentials by an advisory committee com-
posed of national courtjudges.7 ° As we shall see, the draft Con-
stitution proposes a similar high-level review body.
In conclusion, the Treaty of Nice and its Protocol on En-
largement of the European Union have made at least the most
essential modifications in the political and judicial institutions of
the Union to enable the smooth entry of the ten new States on
May 1, 2004. Even if the various innovations in institutional
structure set out in the draft Constitution may be considered
preferable in many respects (and that is a matter of some de-
bate), it is undeniable that the Union can continue to function
quite satisfactorily under the institutional structure provisions of
the Treaty of Nice. It is important to underline this, because the
acrimonious interchanges between leaders of some of the Mem-
ber States during the course of the recent deliberations over the
draft Constitution might give the impression that failure to
adopt the Constitution would cripple the functional efficiency of
the institutions.
II. ENLARGEMENT IN SIGHT
On May 1, 2004, the European Union will undergo the most
dramatic change in membership in its history.7 ' Ten new Mem-
ber States - Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slove-
69. EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 225a. Although CFI President Vesterdorf urges the
Council to create such judicial panels "in order to alleviate the workload of the CFI,"
supra note 62, at 318, former Judge Kapteyn contends that they might create risks of
delay and excessive appeals, and urges instead "specialized courts" at the same level as
the CFI, supra note 65, at 179.
70. Kapteyn, supra note 65, at 188-89. He even suggests that the Parliament be
involved in the appointment procedure - an approach not taken in the draft Constitu-
tion.
71. Article 2(2) of the Treaty of Athens, supra note 44, sets May 1, 2004 as the
accession date, provided all Member States and applicants have ratified by then.
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nia - will join the present fifteen EU members.72 This is by far
the largest and most complex enlargement of the European
Union to date. 3
The process by which a nation joins, or accedes to the Euro-
pean Union is a relatively long and complex one. 4 Inevitably,
serious legal, political, economic, and social issues must be con-
fronted and resolved satisfactorily. On the one hand, the appli-
cant nations must modify their legal, economic, and social struc-
tures to conform to the pattern set in the European Union. On
the other hand, the institutional structures of the European
Union must be altered to the degree necessary to include and
satisfactorily integrate the representatives of the new States.
However, it has been a basic principle of the European Commu-
nity, and now of the European Union, commonly termed the
"acquis communitaire,'' 75 that the basic constitutional structure,
laws, policies, and programs of the European Union and the Eu-
ropean Community must be accepted by applicant nations in or-
der to join.
Since their liberation from Communist regimes in 1989-91,
most of the countries in Central Europe have sought ultimately
72. See Roger Goebel, Joining the European Union: The Accession Procedures for the
Central European and Mediterranean States, I Loy. UNIV. CHI. INT'L L. REV. (forthcoming
2004) [hereinafter Joining the European Union] (providing a detailed description of the
accession procedure, the negotiations, and the terms of the Treaty of Athens Act of
Accession, by which the ten nations are acceding to the EU).
73. For a description of the circumstances of the first enlargement, when Den-
mark, Ireland, and the U.K. joined the European Economic Community in 1973, and
the second enlargement, when Greece joined in 1981 and Portugal and Spain did in
1986, see DINAN, supra note 14 at 58, 83-84, 104-08. See also The European Union Grows,
supra note 33 (providing a detailed analysis of the third enlargement, the accession of
Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995); Dierk Booss & John Forman, Enlargement: Legal
and ProceduralAspects, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 95 (1995) (concentrating on the negoti-
ations and the terms of accession in the third enlargement). For two recent compila-
tions of excellent papers covering the current enlargement process until approximately
early 2002, see THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (Marise Cremona ed., 2003)
[hereinafter THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION]; HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN
ENLARGEMENT - A COMMENTARY ON THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS (Andrea Ott & Kirstyn
Inglis eds., 2002) [hereinafter HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN ENLARGEMENT].
74. Article 49 of the TEU, supra note 1, sets out the current constitutional proce-
dures that must be followed in an accession. Article 49 is analyzed in Joining the Euro-
pean Union, supra note 72, at Part I.
75. For a discussion of the origin, meaning, and historical evolution of the "acquis
communautaire" concept, see The European Union Grows, supra note 33, at 1140-57. See
also Christophe Delcourt, The Acquis Communautaire: Has the Concept Had its Day?, 38
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 829 (2001) (stressing the importance of the concept, but noting
a certain degree of ambiguity concerning its core meaning).
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to join the European Union. Turkey, Cyprus, and Malta have
had the same aspiration. The European Council in Copenhagen
in June 1993 declared that all of the Central European nations
that entered into Europe Agreements (see below) might ulti-
mately join the European Union, provided that they satisfied
three pre-conditions, which have become famous as the "Copen-
hagen criteria": 1) stable institutions guaranteeing democracy
and the rule of law, with full respect for basic human rights and
the protection of minorities; 2) a functional market economy,
with free market competition, and the ability to "cope with com-
petitive pressure and market forces within the Union;" and 3)
the ability and the administrative infrastructure necessary to ful-
fill all of the obligations of membership, including that in the
Economic and Monetary Union.76
During the period 1995-1999, Europe Agreements 77 with
the eight Central European nations currently joining entered
into force, all with a Preamble declaration that foresaw accession
to the European Union as the Agreement's ultimate goal. The
Europe Agreements contain detailed provisions for the liberali-
zation of trade and investment, the adoption of competition
rules, and the adoption of many of the key legislative measures
of the internal market, all over a transition period of ten years.
The European Community has provided financial and technical
assistance to each nation that has entered into a Europe Agree-
ment.
In 1994-1996, all ten Central European nations which had
signed Europe Agreements formally applied for accession (as Cy-
prus, Malta, and Turkey had done previously). Pursuant to Arti-
cle 49 (formerly Article 0) of the Treaty on European Union, 8
which now governs accession, the Commission made a detailed
review of each applicant's political, economic, and administra-
76. The European Council at Copenhagen on June 21-22, 1993 stated these condi-
tions, which are set out in 26 E.C. BULL., no.6, at 13 (1993).
77. The Commission coined the term, "Europe Agreement," in 1990 to designate
the close association agreements with the Central European nations. For a discussion
of the role and essential terms of Europe Agreements, see The European Union Grows,
supra note 33, at 1106; Frank Hoffmeister, General Principles of the Europe Agreements and
the Association Agreement with Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, in HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN EN-
LARGEMENT, supra note 73, at 349; Marc Maresceau, Pre-Accession, in THE ENLARGEMENT
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 73.
78. See supra note 74.
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tive condition. In June 1997, the Commission issued Opinions 79
on all the applicants, recommending that negotiations for acces-
sion be opened with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hun-
gary, Poland, and Slovenia. The European Council in Luxem-
bourg in December 1997 authorized the opening of negotiations
for accessions with the nations that had received favorable Com-
mission Opinions and set out a pre-accession strategy that in-
cluded all applicant States.80
Accession negotiations began in March 1998 with the six ap-
plicant States designated by the Luxembourg European Council.
During the initial phase, the negotiators reviewed thirty-one
chapters covering all aspects of membership obligations with a
view to identifying the capacity of each applicant to comply with
Community (or Union) rules and the need to negotiate on spe-
cific issues." With this process largely completed in fall 1999,
the negotiations continued on serious substantive issues. Among
the most difficult of these issues were: how to apply the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy, how to achieve the free movement of
workers, how to attain the freedom to provide services and the
right of establishment in certain sensitive sectors (e.g., financial
institutions and telecommunications), and how to phase in the
Community's environmental protection rules.8 2
The European Council in Cologne in June 1999 encour-
aged continued momentum in the negotiations, and the Euro-
pean Council in Helsinki in December 1999 decided to open
negotiations in February 2000 with Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malta, Romania, and Slovakia.83 With regard to Turkey, the Hel-
79. The ten opinions appear as Supplements 6 to 15 to the EU Bulletin for 1997 in
the following order (based on the date of applications of each State): Hungary, Poland,
Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Slove-
nia. A summary of the Commission's conclusions concerning each applicant is pro-
vided in EC COMMISSION, GENERAL REPORT ON THE AcTMTIES ON THE EUROPEAN UNION
- 1997, at 299-303 (1998).
80. E.U. BULL., no. 12, at 10 (1997).
81. Eneko Lanaburu, the Director General of the Directorate General for Enlarge-
ment, describes the negotiation process in Eneko Lanaburu, The Fifth Enlargement of the
European Union: The Powers of Example, 26 FORDHAm INT'L L.J. 1 (2002). The ministerial
level negotiations are described at page 4. For a detailed description of the negotiation
phase of the accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden, see Booss & Forman, supra note
73. See also The European Union Grows, supra note 33, at 1164-69.
82. Joining the European Union, supra note 72, at Part III "The Negotiating Phase"
(providing a detailed description of the pace of negotiations).
83. E.U. BULL., no. 12, at 8 (1999).
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sinki European Council in December 1999 declared that it was
to be regarded as an applicant ultimately capable of joining the
European Union, but that negotiations would not presently be-
gin.8 4 Pre-accession efforts would be undertaken, especially po-
litical efforts to support democratic developments and economic
progress.
The final stages of negotiations with the twelve current can-
didate countries followed the "road map" set in the Commis-
sion's November 8, 2000 progress report 5 and endorsed by the
Nice European Council in December 2000.86 The majority of
the thirty-one negotiation chapters, each on a different substan-
tive topic, had been provisionally closed by the end of 2001 in
the negotiations with each applicant. However, the most diffi-
cult issues, particularly concerning agriculture, had to be dealt
with in 2002.
On October 9, 2002 the Commission's detailed progress re-
port, Towards the Enlarged Union,8 7 concluded that ten applicant
nations satisfied the political criteria set by the Copenhagen Eu-
ropean Council in June 1993, and that all ten would satisfy the
economic and infrastructure criteria by May 2004. The Brussels
European Council in October 2002 endorsed the Commission's
findings, and the Copenhagen European Council on December
12-13, 2002 marked the conclusion of negotiations with the ten,
and set May 1, 2004 for accession."' The new Member States will
each designate a member of the Commission and a judge on the
Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance on that date,
commence their membership and voting in the Council meet-
ings, and will join with the present Member States in the election
84. Id.
85. EC Commission, Enlargement Strategy Paper, COM (2000) 700, summarized
in E.U. BULL., no. 11, at 67-69 (2000), and in COMMISSION GENERAL REPORT - 2000,
supra note 37, at 215.
86. E.U. BULL., no. 12, at 9 (2000). The European Council expressed the hope
that negotiations would conclude in time to permit the successful applicant nations to
participate in the election for Parliament in June 2004.
87. COM (2002) 700, summarized in the COMMISSION GENERAL REPORT - 2002,
supra note 39, at 260. The Commission's report concluded that Bulgaria and Romania
did not yet satisfy either the Copenhagen economic or infrastructure criteria, and that
Turkey did not yet even satisfy the political criterion, although it had made progress in
that direction.
88. E.U. BULL., no. 12, at 8 (2002). The Parliament on November 20, 2002 had
previously endorsed the Commission's conclusions and the time-table for accession.
E.U. BULL., no. 11, at 70 (2002).
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of the Parliament in June 2004. The Copenhagen European
Council called this a "historic milestone" and declared that
"[t]his achievement testifies to the common determination of
the peoples of Europe to come together in a Union that has be-
come the driving source for peace, democracy, stability and pros-
perity in our continent. As fully fledged members of a Union
based on solidarity, these [new Member] [S] tates will play a full
role in shaping the further development of the European pro-
ject."89
At Athens on April 16, 2003, the formal Treaty of Accession
was signed by the representatives of the present Member States
and the ten applicant nations, namely Cyprus, the Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the
Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.9 ° The Treaty and the Act of Ac-
cession together comprise an extremely long document, because
the Annexes and Protocols contain the specific exceptions to
Community or Union rules and any transition periods before
these rules are fully effective with regard to each applicant.
Prior to the Treaty's signature, on April 9th the European Parlia-
ment overwhelmingly voted by over 85% in favor of each candi-
date nation's application for accession.91 In its Resolution on
the Conclusions of the Negotiations on Enlargement, the Parlia-
ment notably emphasized that
the accession of the ten new Member States will be an impor-
tant step in building an even stronger and more effective Eu-
ropean Union which will be needed to further stabilise the
whole continent, consolidating democracy and peace,
strengthening its economy and sustainable development and
incorporating a cultural and human dimension based upon
the shared values of liberty, respect for fundamental rights,
good governance and the rule of law. 92
The ratification process is moving smoothly towards conclu-
sion. Each of the applicant countries except Cyprus held a refer-
endum on accession, but all present Member States are ratifying
by parliamentary action. Malta's referendum, the first, provided
89. E.U. BULL., no. 12, at 9-10 (2002).
90. See supra note 46.
91. O.J. L 236/5 to 13 (Sept. 23, 2003).
92. Conclusions of the Copenhagen Negotiations on Enlargement, Apr. 9, 2003,
available at www.europarl.eu.int/meetdocs/delegations/esto/20030515/1 O.pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 21, 2004).
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only a narrow 54% majority for accession,"3 but Slovenia's refer-
endum, the second, produced a resounding 90% affirmative
vote,9 4 as did the later referenda in Lithuania and the Slovak
Republic.95 The people of Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and
the Czech Republic also voted in favor by convincingly large ma-
jorities.9 6
With regard to Cyprus, the Helsinki European Council in
December 1999 urged renewed negotiations between the di-
vided Greek and Turkish communities, but asserted that unifica-
tion was not a precondition for accession. The Brussels Euro-
pean Council on October 24-25, 2002 reiterated its "preference
for a reunited Cyprus to join the European Union."97 Despite
vigorous negotiations under UN auspices, an agreement has not
yet been reached. The Copenhagen European Council on De-
cember 12-13, 2002 concluded that Greek Cyprus could join
alone, if no settlement is reached. 98
At least tensions between the Greek and Turkish communi-
ties have been considerably reduced in 2003, particularly by the
opening of the border to enable people to make visits, so that a
long-term solution is no longer so doubtful. Moreover, on De-
cember 14, 2003, elections in the Turkish sector of Cyprus pro-
duced a parliament evenly divided between parties favoring and
a party opposing unification, 9 giving rise to at least some hope
that a compromise solution on unification may yet be reached.
With their accession in May 2004, the applicant States will
become subject to the Treaty rules and principles, notably the
four freedoms, and to most of the internal market, agricultural,
competition, social, environmental, transport, and other legisla-
tive rules.100 Indeed, the applicant States have been in the pro-
93. E.U. BULL., no. 3, at 82 (2003).
94. Id.
95. E.U. BULL., no. 5, at 62-63 (2003).
96. Hungary's referendum resulted in an 84% affirmative vote, E.U. BULL., no. 4,
at 48 (2003), while those in the Czech Republic and Poland each yielded a 77% affirma-
tive vote, E.U. BULL., no. 6, at 91-92 (2003). See also Nicholas George, Latvian 'Yes Vote
Paves way for Latest Addition to EU, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2003, at 2 (67% vote in favor);
All In to Europe, ECONOMIST, Sept. 20, 2003, at 48 (Estonian vote two-thirds in favor,
despite June opinion polls showing an almost equal split).
97. E.U. BULL., no. 10, at 8 (2002).
98. E.U. BULL., no. 12, at 9 (2002).
99. See Andreas Hadjipapas, North Cyprus Poll Deals Blow to EU Hope, FIN. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 2003, at 4.
100. On July 2001, a Commission report to Parliament estimated that the appli-
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cess of adopting national legislation to conform to many of the
Community directives and regulations in accordance with their
obligations under the Europe Agreements. Not only is the adop-
tion of so much new legislation an onerous task, but the new
Member States must substantially improve their administrative
and judicial capacity to make the new rules operationally effec-
tive. Accordingly, on June 5, 2002, the Commission initiated an
action plan to strengthen the administrative and judicial capabil-
ities of each applicant. 1 ' Special attention is being devoted to
educating judges about the fundamental principles of Union
and Community law and their appropriate mode of application
and interpretation.
As in past accessions, the Athens Treaty's Act of Accession is
supplemented by a series of Annexes that provide for a number
of multi-year transition periods to phase in specific Treaty or leg-
islative rules.0 2 Some periods are specific to individual appli-
cant States, while others apply overall. Thus, total free move-
ment of workers has been deferred for up to seven years, in par-
ticular to meet the concerns of Austria and Germany that they
would otherwise be confronted with a flood of migrant labor
from Central European nations with chronic high unemploy-
ment. The restrictions are stated in virtually identical terms in
the Annexes covering the eight Central European applicants.
(There are none in the Annexes for Cyprus and Malta, which
have small populations and low unemployment rates). Thus, in
Annex V for the Czech Republic, article 1(2) permits present
Member States to continue their current national measures "reg-
ulating access to their labor markets by Czech nationals" until
the end of a five year period following accessions. 0 3 Article 1(3)
breaks the five years into an initial two year period, toward the
cant States would have to translate into their own language some 90,000 pages of legis-
lative texts constituting the "acquis communautaire." Commission Press Release, IP/01/
1145 (July 30, 2001).
101. See COMMISSION GENERAL REPORT - 2002, supra note 39, at 263.
102. The Act of Accession, supra note 45, states in Article 24 that transitional mea-
sures are listed in Annexes V to XIV. Each applicant thus has an Annex that lists all
transitional measures applicable to that State. The sequence is as follows: Annex V
Czech Republic; VI Estonia; VII Cyprus; VIII Latvia; IX Lithuania; X Hungary; XI Malta;
XII Poland; XIII Slovenia; XIV Slovakia.
103. Act of Accession, supra note 45, ann. V, art. 1(2). The text does grant Czech
nationals who have legally been employed for at least twelve consecutive months in a
Member State full rights of "access to the labour market of that Member State but not
to the labour markets of other Member States applying national measures."
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end of which the Commission must make a report concerning
migrant labor, and the Council must review the situation. Fol-
lowing this, each present Member State has the option of contin-
uing its restrictive measures for another three years. Article 1 (5)
permits the possible extension of such restrictions for a final two
year period if a State can demonstrate that it is experiencing "se-
rious disturbances of its labour market. 10 4
In the environmental protection sector, most Central Euro-
pean nations must incur significant costs in cleaning up severe
pollution and replacing dangerous nuclear reactors or reducing
other environmental risks. Accordingly, substantial periods of
time have been allotted to phase in particular rules or to remove
certain hazards, e.g., the dismantling of old and potentially dan-
gerous nuclear facilities in Lithuania and the Slovak Republic.
Some applicant countries feared extensive purchases of
their real estate, especially farms and secondary residences, by
buyers from Union States, so transitional regimes prohibiting
land purchases by non-nationals were agreed. Thus, Malta re-
ceived a right to retain indefinitely its present restrictions on for-
eign ownership of secondary residences, 10 5 while Cyprus, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland may retain their restric-
tions for five years.' 6 All the Central European States except
Slovenia received a derogation to protect ownership by nationals
of agricultural land and forests for seven years 0 7 (Poland for
twelve years).1 8
The most controversial transition period is with regard to
the complete application of the Common Agricultural Policy
104. Id. art. 1(7). During this seven year period, a Member State may require
Czech nationals to possess work permits "for monitoring purposes."
105. Treaty of Athens, supra note 44, Protocol No. 6 on the acquisition of secon-
dary residences in Malta. The Protocol cites "the very limited number of residences in
Malta and the very limited land available for construction." Id. It is worth noting that
Denmark obtained a Protocol to the Treaty of Maastricht enabling it to retain indefi-
nitely its restrictions on the foreign ownership of secondary residences.
106. See Act of Accession, supra note 45, ann. V for the Czech Republic, art. 2(1);
ann. VII for Cyprus, art. 3; ann. X for Hungary, art. 3(1); ann. XII for Poland, art. 4(1).
107. See, e.g., Act of Accession, supra note 45, ann. V for the Czech Republic, art.
3(2); ann. VIII for Latvia, art. 3. Indeed, the seven year transitional periods may in each
case be extended for a further three years if the Commission accepts that the State
concerned has provided sufficient evidence that this is necessary to avoid "serious dis-
turbances or the threat of serious disturbances on the agricultural land market."
108. Id. ann. XII for Poland, art. 4(1). Poland does not, however, have the right to
request the Commission for an extension.
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("CAP"). Because in Poland, Hungary, and several other appli-
cants such a large percentage of the population is engaged in
farming, and because the farms are usually small and often inef-
ficient, the EU made clear at the outset of negotiations that its
subsidies and support programs could only be phased in gradu-
ally.
After the Commission issued a strategy paper on enlarge-
ment and agriculture on January 30, 2002,09 the Member States
began a difficult debate on adopting a negotiation posture on
agricultural aid, only concluding in late October 2002.0 Then
the arduous negotiations with Poland, Hungary, and other appli-
cants with large agricultural sectors began. A final session held
at the time of the Copenhagen European Council meeting in
December 2002 achieved a compromise that somewhat sweet-
ened the result for the applicant States.1"
The final agricultural aid package is complex, easily under-
stood only by specialists. The most important element is the
phasing in of the direct subsidy payments to farmers, which will
begin in 2004 at 25% of the level granted to farmers in current
Member States, rising gradually in percentage increments annu-
ally until they hit 100% in 2013.112 The applicants may increase
("top up") the 25% amount by using their own funds to attain
the level of 55% in 2004, and continue this "topping up" by 30%
each year thereafter. In addition, the applicants will receive a
special rural development aid package fixed at 5 billion Euros
for 2004-2006.
In view of the fact that their farmers will receive substan-
tially lower amounts of farm aid than those in current Member
States, the applicant nations will undoubtedly exert efforts for
the creation of alternative employment in rural areas and the
encouragement of early retirement of farmers.
109. E.U. BULL., no. 1-2, at 107 (2002).
110. See, e.g., Elaine Sciolino, A Fight over Farms Ends, Opening Way to Wider Europe,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2002, at A3 (Member States agreed to grant the applicants initially
25% of the customary farm aid level, phasing in the remainder in annual 5% incre-
ments).
111. See, e.g., Elaine Sciolino, European Union Acts to Admit 10 Nations, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 2002, at A20 (Poland succeeded in obtaining a further $430 million in farm aid
for the new States between 2004 and 2006)
112. The agricultural aid package is described in detail in Commission Press Re-
lease, IP/02/1882 (Dec. 13, 2002), summarized in THOMSON, EUROPEAN UNION LAW
REPORTER, EU UPDATE 1170 (2003).
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Indeed, already in 2002, the Community allocated 550 mil-
lion Euros to the rural development program, principally in Po-
land, Hungary, Romania, and the Czech and Slovak Repub-
lics. 13 Nonetheless, many farmers are dissatisfied with the ac-
cord, and many less efficient farmers on small farms are apt to
cease farming. 1
4
The Annexes to the Act of Accession contain numerous fur-
ther transitional arrangements, but these are largely of concern
only to specialists. Worth noting, however, are the emergency
safeguard provisions in the Act of Accession itself. Under Article
37, during the initial three years after accession, either a present
or a new Member State may request the Commission to author-
ize emergency protective measures to ameliorate "serious deteri-
oration in the economic situation of a given area."115 Under Ar-
ticle 38, the Commission has the power to adopt "safeguard mea-
sures" to remedy any "serious breach of the functioning of the
internal market due to a new Member State's violation of its
commitments," again during an initial three years after acces-
sion." 6 Experience after past accessions suggests that neither
Article is apt to be frequently invoked, but these emergency safe-
guard provisions are manifestly a prudent precaution.
Pre-accession financial aid to the Central European nations
has been substantial. In 2002, the Phare program for infrastruc-
ture and technical aid totaled 1.7 billion Euros, including, for
example, 80 million Euros to Lithuania to phase out its out-of-
date nuclear plants."1 7 In addition, the European Investment
Bank provided 3.6 billion Euros in loans, chiefly for communica-
tions and telecommunication infrastructure development and
for flood relief and control.1 18 It is evident that substantial
amounts from the Community's structural and infrastructure aid
funds will in the future have to be devoted to the needs of the
applicant countries, a prospect which naturally concerns the
113. EC COMMISSION, GENERAL REPORT - 2002, supra note 39, at 271.
114. See, e.g., Christopher Condon, Small Farmers Face "Devastation," FIN. TIMES, May
2, 2003, at 4 (reporting concern that 250,000 small family farms in Hungary will be-
come uncompetitive).
115. Act of Accession, supra note 45, art. 37.
116. Id. art. 38
117. E.C. COMMISSION, GENERAL REPORT - 2002, supra note 39, at 270.
118. Id. at 54
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chief past recipients of such aid (notably Greece, Ireland, and
Portugal).
In its October 2002 progress report, the Commission indi-
cated that it would continue monitoring the progress of the ap-
plicant nations until accession. Accordingly, on November 5,
2003, the Commission provided a special Comprehensive Moni-
toring Report on the status of the ten applicants by mid-2003. 19
The report indicated general satisfaction in the political sphere,
but noted the necessity for on-going efforts to achieve the appro-
priate treatment of minorities, notably the Russians in the Baltic
States, the Hungarians in the Slovak Republic, and the Roma
people in Hungary, Romania and the Slovak Republic. The re-
port also emphasized the need for significant improvement of
the civil service and the judiciary in most States, and expressed
particular concern about prevalent corruption in some States.
In the economic sphere, although all of the ten applicants are
considered to be market economies, several are relatively fragile
economies that may find it difficult to meet the challenge of
competition within the Union. In view of the fact that none of
the Central European applicants have a GDP per person close to
that of the lowest current Member State, Portugal, it is apparent
that stable economic growth remains a critical imperative for
them. None of the applicants is presently capable ofjoining the
Monetary Union and adopting the Euro, although all would like
to do so, and Cyprus and Malta may be capable of joining the
Euro area in 2007 or 2008.
A final word concerning the applicant nations that will not
be joining on May 1, 2004. Even Bulgaria and Romania accept
that their economic progress has lagged behind that of the other
candidate States. In its October 2002 and November 2003 re-
ports, the Commission asserted that both fulfilled the Copenha-
gen political criterion but would require several years to meet
fully the economic and infrastructure criteria. The two coun-
tries proposed 2007 as the target date for accession, which the
Commission accepted. Although the December 12-13, 2002 Co-
penhagen European Council endorsed this target, it did so pro-
vided that each applicant makes sufficient progress by that time,
119. E.C. COMMISSION, COMPREHENSIVE MONITORING REPORT ON THE STATE OF
PREPAREDNESS FOR E.U. MEMBERSHIP (Nov. 5, 2003), available at http://www.europa.eu.
int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/index.htm.
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and the European Council specifically underlined "the impor-
tance of judicial and administrative reform" in this context.1 20
On November 5, 2003, the Commission issued a special progress
report on the pre-accession status of Bulgaria and Romania.' 21
While both continue to make political and economic progress,
Romania lags behind economically. Both also continue to have
serious problems in upgrading their administrative and judicial
infrastructure. It is certainly by no means sure that each will be
able to meet the 2007 target date for accession.
Incidentally, Croatia formally applied for accession in Feb-
ruary 2003, and is considered to be quite likely to join the EU
before the end of the decade, provided that it cooperates in the
prosecution of individuals accused of human right violations
during the civil war in Bosnia. The Commission indicated in
March that it would start reviewing Croatia's qualifications for
accession.
2 2
With regard to Turkey, the Commission's October 2002 re-
port concluded that it does not satisfy any of the Copenhagen
criteria, although praising it for substantial headway in all three
areas. 123 The Turkish government continues to press vigorously
for political and human rights reforms, as well as for economic
progress, and requests accession negotiations with increasing in-
tensity. Thus, in July 2003, Turkey adopted legislation intended
to place the military under stronger political control, and per-
mitting use of languages other than Turkish in education and in
the media. 124  The December 2002 Copenhagen European
Council declined to set a target date for negotiations, but stated
that if the Commission concluded that Turkey fulfilled the politi-
cal criterion at the time of its December 2004 meeting, then the
European Council would authorize the initiation of accession
120. E.U. BULL., no. 12, at 10 (2002).
121. E.C. COMMISSION, CONTINUING ENLARGEMENT - STRATEGY PAPER AND REPORT
ON THE PROGRESS TOWARDS ACESSION By BULGARIA, ROMANIA AND TURKEY (Nov. 5,
2003), available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/index.
htm.
122. E.U. BULL., no. 3, at 102 (2003).
123. E.C. Commission, Towards the Enlarged Union, COM (2002) 700 Final (Oct.
2002).
124. See, e.g., Dexter Filkins, Turkey: Parliament Backs Reforms, N.Y. TIMES, June 20,
2003, at A8 (Turkish legislation authorizes radio broadcasts in Kurdish); Turkey Moves to
Limit Military's Clout, INT'L HERALD TRuB., July 31, 2003, at 4 (powers of military's Na-
tional Security Council reduced).
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negotiations. 125 Even if this should occur, however, such negoti-
ations may prove to be quite lengthy in view of Turkey's rela-
tively weak economy. Because Turkey is considered to have a
fairly decisive influence over the Turkish community in Cyprus,
a peaceful integration of the Greek and Turkish communities
may well also prove to be an implicit pre-condition for Turkey's
accession. 126
III. THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION
A. The Convention
By the end of 2001, the political leaders of the Member
States and of the Commission were aware that accession negotia-
tions were moving forward at a good pace and that the next en-
largement was imminent. Although the Treaty of Nice provided
an adequate modification in institutional structure to enable the
new States to join the Union, many leaders did not consider it to
be ideal. Moreover, a growing consensus was developing to the
effect that other aspects of the Treaties needed to be reviewed to
try to simplify and clarify the text, augment the role of the Parlia-
ment and democratic legitimacy generally, provide Treaty force
to the new Nice Charter of Fundamental Rights, etc. Indeed,
the Treaty of Nice itself annexed a Declaration on the Future of
the Union which called for a "deeper and wider debate about
the future of the European Union" to begin in 2001 and
culminate in yet another Intergovernmental Conference. 27
The rapid and effective work of the Convention which
drafted the Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2000128 inspired
125. E.U. BULL., no. 12, at 10 (2002).
126. See, e.g.,Judy Dempsey, 'Cyprus Problem' Threatens Turkey's EU Aim, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 5, 2003, at 4; Judy Dempsey, Turkey Told that Cyprus Deal Would Assist its Bid to Join
EU, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2003, at 3.
127. Declaration on the Future of the Union, annexed to the Treaty of Nice, supra
note 4, OJ.C. 80/1, at 85 (2001), at points 3 and 7. The IGC was there scheduled for
2004, but events moved more swiftly.
128. The now famous Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union was
formally proclaimed on Dec. 7, 2000 by the Presidents of the three political institutions.
See COMMISSION, GENERAL REPORT - 2000, supra note 37, at 15-17. The Charter was
drafted by a special sixty-two member Convention, chaired by Roman Herzog, a leading
German jurist and statesman, and composed of representatives of the Member State
governments, national parliaments, the European Parliament, and the Commission. Al-
though a prestigious source of principles, the Charter was not annexed to the Nice
Treaty and has no binding legal effect. The European Council at Nice put off for later
consideration "the question of the charter's force." E.U. BULL., no. 12, at 8 (2000). For
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the idea that a similar body should be constituted to produce a
more coherent and comprehensible Treaty structure for the Eu-
ropean Union. Accordingly, the Laeken European Council on
December 15, 2001 decided to convene a Convention for this
purpose.129 The Laeken European Council instructed the Con-
vention to consider simplifying the treaties, perhaps reorganiz-
ing them into a constitutional text and incorporating the Char-
ter of Rights, more clearly delineating the Union's spheres of
competences, and boosting the democratic legitimacy and trans-
parency of the institutions.130 This Convention was rapidly des-
ignated and commenced work on February 28, 2002, with the
charge of producing a new constitutional treaty before the June
2003 European Council session.
The Convention was chaired by Valery Giscard d'Estaing,
former President of France, with the former Prime Minister of
Belgium, Mr. Dehaene, and the former Prime Minister of Italy,
Mr. Amato, acting as Vice-Chairmen. 13 1 Both the current and
applicant States were represented in the 105 members of the
Convention. 112 The governments of the Member States and the
applicants each designated one representative, totaling twenty-
eight, and the Commission named two Commissioners. The Eu-
ropean Parliament delegated sixteen MEPs and each Member
State national parliament sent two representatives, while the ap-
plicant countries' parliaments sent one each. The Convention
body was accordingly representative of far more diverse political
views than would be a traditional Inter-governmental Confer-
ence, which represents only the Member State governments.
The Convention divided itself into eleven working groups,
each to deal with a particular issue (e.g., subsidiarity, economic
governance, the area of freedom, security and justice, external
relations). 33 The Convention operated in three phases. In the
first or "listening phase," from March to August 2002, the Con-
vention commenced its analysis and gathered information, espe-
valuable and expert assessments, see Grdinne de Birca, The Drafting of the European
Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, 26 EUR. L. REv. 126 (2001); Koen Lenaerts, Funda-
mental Rights in the European Union, 25 EUR. L. REv. 575 (2000).
129. See COMMISSION GENERAL REPORT - 2001, supra note 5.
130. Id. at 12-13.
131. COMMISSION, GENERAL REPORT - 2002, supra note 39, at 11.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 12.
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cially soliciting outside views (which literally poured in)."' The
second, or "deliberative phase," lasted from September to De-
cember, and consisted of developing policy positions and draft-
ing initial working texts.'" 5 Notably, on October 28-29, 2002, the
twelve member Presidium, or steering committee, produced a
preliminary draft treaty text.
The third, or "summarizing phase," began in January 2003
and was concluded with the Convention's presentation of a draft
Constitution text to the European Council on June 20, 2003.136
This was, of course, a massive undertaking. The draft Constitu-
tion is bound to have a great influence on the future structure of
the European Union. It should, however, be immediately em-
phasized that the only manner of amending or replacing the
present Treaty on European Union and the European Commu-
nity Treaty is through an Intergovernmental Conference consti-
tuted by representatives of the Member State governments
alone, in accordance with TEU Article 48. In such an IGC, each
Member State has an effective veto. As we shall see, the IGC
held in fall 2003 was unable to endorse entirely the draft Consti-
tution.
On December 4, 2002, the Commission sought to influence
the final deliberations of the Convention by a report, "For the
European Union - Peace, Freedom, Solidarity"137 together with
a working draft text of a "Constitution of the European Union"
(sometimes called the Prodi draft), which presented its views on
key issues. The Commission urged that co-decision should es-
sentially be the sole legislative mode and that the Council should
virtually always act by a qualified majority vote. The Commission
proposed that its President should be elected by the European
Parliament and that the Commission should be politically ac-
countable both to the Council and Parliament. The Commis-
sion also supported the present six month rotation for the Presi-
dency of the European Council and the General Affairs Council
(the Council of Ministers' meetings of Foreign Affairs Ministers
specifically to deal with most general European Community is-
sues). With regard to foreign affairs, the Commission proposed
134. Id. at 13-14.
135. Id. at 14-15.
136. See Draft Treaty, supra note 6, O.J. C 169/1 (July 18, 2003).
137. COM (2002) 728 Final (Dec. 2002), summarized in COMMISSION, GENERAL
REPORT - 2002, supra note 39, at 15-16.
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the effective merging of the posts of the Council Secretary Gen-
eral (presently Javier Solano) and the Commissioner responsible
for foreign affairs (presently Chris Patten), into a Secretary of
the European Union, who would have the status of a Commis-
sioner but report also to the Council.
Naturally, the European Parliament weighed into the de-
bate with a number of resolutions on specific issues. Not surpris-
ingly, it endorsed co-decision and Council qualified majority vot-
ing as virtually the sole legislative mode. The Parliament also
urged the simplification and relabeling of legislative acts, a more
precise delineation of competences of the Union and of the
Member States, and the grant of legal personality to the Euro-
pean Union.1 38
In a final rather frenzied series of sessions in May and June,
the Convention largely completed its work on the text proposed
by President Giscard d'Estaing and the Presidium. Although
there had been a risk of minority dissenting reports, the Conven-
tion ultimately endorsed one text. The Convention report to
the Thessalonica European Council on June 20-21, 2003 pro-
vided a complete Constitution text, but the Convention re-
quested and received permission to make further "technical"
changes to the Constitution Part III dealing with policies and
activities. 39 Accordingly, the Convention actually completed its
drafting on July 10th. 4 ° The Thessalonica European Council
welcomed the draft Constitution "as a good basis for starting the
intergovernmental conference" which it set to begin in October
2003.141
B. The Draft Constitution: Institutional Provisions
The Convention divided its text into four parts: a constitu-
tional section that sets out basic principles and the nature and
role of the institutions; a second section devoted to the Charter
of Fundamental Rights; a third section on the structure of the
institutions and the substantive fields of action; and a final sec-
tion on essential accessory matters. Naturally, most attention
138. The resolutions are summarized in the COMMISSION, GENERAL REPORT -
2002, supra note 39, at 16.
139. E.U. BULL., no. 6, at 9 (2003).
140. E.U. BULL., no. 7-8, at 9 (2003).
141. E.U. BULL., no. 6, at 9 (2003).
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and debate thus far has centered on Part I, whose title is "Defini-
tion and Objectives of the Union."
The draft Constitution is long, complex, and requires care-
ful reading before evaluation. 142 Certainly it is in many respects
better structured and more comprehensible than the present
TEU and EC Treaties (which, together with Euratom, will be
unified in a single text). Nonetheless, it remains a lengthy, de-
tailed and quite technical document, one which will not easily be
understood by those who are not already relatively expert.
This brief summary can only provide a quick review of the
most important changes that would be made by the Constitu-
tion, particularly with regard to institutional structure. But first,
a few words on the title and the Preamble.
Several hot debates concerned the title of the new Treaty
and key references in the Preamble. The great "C" word debate
ended with acceptance of the term "Constitution for Europe" as
the title for the new Treaty. The U.K. had initially opposed this,
but eventually yielded. The Court of Justice has famously re-
ferred to the European Community's constituent treaties as a
"constitutional charter," '143 and legal experts have increasingly
accepted this concept. 144
On the other hand, with regard to the "F" word, the U.K.
won the debate - the title, "federal union," will not appear in
the Preamble text. A "G" word debate also developed as a result
of Poland's suggestion that the word "God" be inserted in some
manner in the Preamble, a proposal opposed by delegates from
nations with a more secular tradition. The Preamble refers to
the "cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe,"
but not to "God" or to "Christian." Although Poland and several
other States continued to press for express reference to a Chris-
tian heritage during the Intergovernmental Conference, no
change was made. Incidentally, the Preamble text as a whole,
142. The current publication of the draft Constitution appears in O.J. C 169/1
(July 18, 2003).
143. Although the Court first used this nomenclature in 1986, its most famous
reference came in Opinion 1/91 on the European Economic Area, [1991] ECR 1-6084,
at 21: "the EEC Treaty . . . constitutes the constitutional charter of a Community
based on the rule of law."
144. The well-known Article by the present Director-General of the Legal Service
of the Council, Jean-Claude Piris, Does the European Union Have a Constitution? Does it
Need One?, 24 EUR. L. REv. 557 (1997), concludes that the Treaties have essential ele-
ments of a constitution, although certainly not creating a State as such.
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largely drafted by Giscard d'Estaing himself, has been widely crit-
icized as too verbose and rhetorical.
We turn now to review the most salient innovations in, or
modifications to, institutional structure made by the draft Con-
stitution. First, the European Council. Article 1-20 will make the
European Council formally one of the Union institutions, al-
though its role will not change. 14 5 It will still primarily define
the Union's "general political directions and priorities."'4 6 What
is novel is that the European Council will now have the power to
take legally binding decisions. The European Council will usu-
ally act by consensus, as in the past, but may use the new form of
qualified majority vote (see below) for some specified decisions.
One of the most controversial innovations proposed by the
Convention is the creation of the post of President of the Euro-
pean Council in Article 1-21.147 (The media has often termed
this office "President of the Union" - an erroneous designa-
tion, but one that may yet become popular). This person's prin-
cipal role would be to chair sessions of the European Council
and "drive forward its work," assuring "proper preparation and
continuity." '148 This suggests an active agenda-setting role, and
not simply a ceremonial role as the chair for meetings. The
President will also represent the Union in the Common Foreign
and Security Policy sphere. The President of the European
Council will serve a term of two and one-half years, renewable
once.
Conceivably a dynamic President might assume a leadership
role both in internal and global affairs. The large States, includ-
ing the U.K., endorsed the proposed President, but initially the
post was vigorously opposed by the Benelux and other smaller
States. The Commission is also concerned that such a post
might diminish the status and power of the Commission Presi-
dent,149 which it prefers to enhance. The larger States won on
this issue in the Convention, and it was not seriously reexamined
in the Intergovernmental Conference.
145. O.J. C 169/1, at 12 (July 18, 2003).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Art. 1-21(2), O.J. C 169/1, at 12 (July 18, 2003).
149. See COMMISSION OPINION ON THE DRafr CONSTITUTION, COM (2003) 548
(Sept. 17, 2003), at 10, specifically urging that the status and role of the President of the
European Council be spelled out more precisely.
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The Constitution text which reworked the Nice Treaty com-
promise concerning the Commission is among the most contro-
versial. As we have seen, the Nice Treaty Protocol on Enlarge-
ment provides that a system of equal rotation of Commissioners
among all Member States should be adopted as soon as there are
twenty-seven Member States (which is apt to occur in 2007 if Bul-
garia and Romania join then).15° Various proposals in the Con-
vention suggested a division between voting and non-voting
Commissioners, full and deputy commissioners, or rotation only
of the Commissioners designated by smaller States. None of the
proposals met with a consensus of support. Article 1-25 of the
Constitution provides that the Commission will have a ceiling of
fifteen Commissioners, chosen in a system of equal rotation
among the Member States. 1 ' The Commission President will
have the power to appoint "non-voting Commissioners" from
Member States without a voting Commissioner. The issue re-
mained a sensitive one in the IGC, and the present text is un-
likely to survive if negotiations resume in 2004 (see below).
Article 1-26 will enhance the powers of the President of the
Commission over the rest of the Commission.152 Initially, the
President will have a greater say in the selection process. Mem-
ber States allotted a Commissioner will nominate three potential
candidates, but the President will actually choose the Commis-
sioner from among the three. The President may also require a
Commissioner to resign without being obliged to obtain the con-
sent of the entire Commission, as the Nice Treaty provides. Fur-
thermore, the President shall set guidelines for the Commis-
sion's operations and determine its "internal organization." Ob-
viously, this means that the President can allocate the
Directorate-General portfolios among the Commissioners (pre-
sumably including non-voting Commissioners), and later reallo-
cate them, or even restructure the Directorates-General. Conse-
quently, on an inner operational basis, the Commission Presi-
dent will be more powerful than ever. In external relations
150. John Temple Lang, How Much Do the Smaller States Need the European Commis-
sion? The Role of the Commission in a Changing Europe, 39 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 315
(2002) strongly criticizes the rotation approach and argues that every State should be
represented by a Commissioner.
151. O.J. C 169/1, at 14 (July 18, 2003).
152. O.J. C 169/1, at 14 (July 18, 2003).
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however, the President's role and authority are apt to be dimin-
ished.
Another major and controversial innovation is the creation
of the office of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs (Article I-
27),15 a post that will combine the roles of the current Secretary
General, Javier Solano, who reports to the Council and the Com-
missioner responsible for non-commercial external relations,
Chris Patten. The new Minister for Foreign affairs will thus have
both enhanced power and prestige. This Minister will be ap-
pointed by the European Council, but acting by a Qualified Ma-
jority decision (as defined in article 1-24),154 and subject to the
agreement of the President of the Commission. The Minister
will exercise a dual function. Within the Common Foreign Pol-
icy sector, he or she will make proposals and act under the con-
trol of the Council. In general external relations, the Minister
will be a member of the Commission and responsible for "han-
dling external relations." An energetic Minister will obviously
have a high profile and exercise considerable power, but critics
of the proposed post worry about a conflict of interest arising
through the Minister's dual responsibility to the Council and the
Commission. The Constitution is also imprecise about the rela-
tionship between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Presi-
dent of the European Council on the one hand, and between
the Minister and the President of the Commission on the other.
The Convention also reexamined the Nice Protocol com-
promise on weighted voting in the Council. President Giscard
d'Estaing and the Presidium apparently felt that the weighted
voting of medium-sized and smaller States is out of proportion to
their population. As we have seen, Spain has (and Poland will
have) twenty-seven weighted votes, as compared to twenty-nine
for Germany, France, Italy, and the U.K., although the popula-
tions of Spain and Poland are only half that of Germany and
about two-thirds that of the other three larger nations.
Article 1-24 of the Constitution sweeps away the system of
weighted votes.'55 The Qualified Majority Vote in the Council
for legislation and most decisions will be satisfied by the affirma-
tive vote of a simple majority of Member States, provided they
153. O.J. C 169/1, at 14 (July 18, 2003).
154. O.J. C 169/1, at 13 (July 18, 2003).
155. Id.
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represent at least three fifths of the Union's population. The
same vote system will be used by the European Council in taking
decisions, unless a Constitution provision requires unanimity.
Such a Qualified Majority Vote would be obviously easier to
achieve than one under the current system, and would increase
the importance of affirmative votes by the four largest States
(Germany, France, Italy, and the U.K.). Vigorous opposition
from some States, notably Spain, led to a decision to introduce
the new voting system only on November 1, 2009. This has the
effect that the next multi-year framework agreement on the EU
budget and the cohesion fund will be set by the Council under
the Nice qualified majority formula (under which Spain has a
greater voice). As noted below, the voting formula text proved
to be the most contentious issue during the IGC. The Brussels
European Council's failure to resolve this issue has blocked ap-
proval of the draft Constitution.
Noteworthy also is that the system of rotating the pre-
sidencies of the Council in its meetings will be largely preserved
(in contrast to the chairmanship of the European Council by its
President). Under Article 1-23, the European Council must take
a European decision to set the rotation on an "equal" basis
among the Member States, but for periods of one year, instead
of the present six-month presidencies.156 (Under Article 1-32, a
European decision is a binding non-legislative act).157 The ex-
ception will be the Foreign Affairs Council, whose chair will be
the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
The formula for the representation of Member States in the
Parliament as set out in the Nice Treaty and the Protocol on
Enlargement has the effect of over-representing smaller States at
the expense of the four largest States, especially Germany, which
would be entitled to around thirty more MEPs if the calculation
were made strictly based on population. Article 1-19 provides
that the European Council, prior to the 2009 EP elections, must
allocate the 736 MEPs among the States in a "digressively pro-
portional" manner, with a minimum of four MEPs for a smaller
State (e.g., Malta and Luxembourg). However, the European
Council must act unanimously, which makes it hard to predict
156. O.J. C 169/1, at 13 (July 18, 2003).
157. O.J. C 169/1, at 16 (July 18, 2003).
158. o.J. C 169/1, at 12 (July 18, 2003).
2004]
494 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 27:455
whether representation will be truly proportional (as it is in the
US House of Representatives) or will continue to some degree to
give excessive representation to smaller States.
Article 1-28 on the Court of Justice somewhat confusingly
uses that term as the composite reference (without a plural) for
"the European Court of Justice, the High Court and specialised
courts."1 59 The Court of First Instance is to receive a new name,
the High Court, in its English language version. The ECJ will
continue to consist of one judge from each State, and the High
Court will have "at least one judge per Member State."' 60 The
six year term of judges, renewable, is not altered. The Article
does not govern the relationship between the courts or their re-
spective jurisdictions, which will be governed by the Statute of
the Court of Justice.
An innovation whose functional utility appears obvious is
Article III-262's creation of an advisory panel to review the suita-
bility of nominees for Judges prior to their final designation. 16 1
The seven member panel will be composed of former Judges of
the two Courts, national supreme court judges, and "lawyers of
recognised competence." 162
C. The Draft Constitution: Non-Institutional Provisions
The goal of simplification led the Convention to unify the
Union and the Community in the Constitution, granting the
Union legal personality and absorbing all of the decision making
of the second and third pillars into the normal Community pro-
cedures, but over transition periods and with unusual voting
mechanisms, including opt-outs. The changes in the provisions
concerning the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice are so
complicated that they cannot be reviewed here, other than to say
that qualified majority voting will usually be the normal mode
for action, eliminating national vetoes even in sensitive sectors
such as asylum, immigration policy, and external border con-
trols.
As for the sector of the Common Foreign and Security Pol-
icy, efforts to obtain acceptance of qualified majority voting did
159. OJ. C 169/1, at 14-15 (July 18, 2003).
160. Art. 1-28(2), O.J. C 169/1, at 15 (July 18, 2003).
161. O.J. C 169/1, at 78 (July 18, 2003).
162. Id.
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not succeed. However, the role of the Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs should promote coordination. Also, the European Council,
under Article 1-39, may by unanimity permit the Council of Min-
isters to act by qualified majority in certain fields or circum-
stances. 163 Under Article 1-15, Member States are supposed to
support the Union's CFSP in "a spirit of loyalty and mutual soli-
darity" and "refrain from action contrary to the Union's inter-
ests." '16 4 Finally, under Article 1-40, in the field of Security Policy,
the Union may take collective action toward a "common de-
fence" goal.165 The Union may use "civil and military" forces
outside the Union "for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and
strengthening international security in accordance with the prin-
ciples of the United Nations Charter." '166 Incidentally, the Con-
stitution's attribution of legal personality to the Union in Article
1-6 will enable the Union to enter into international agreements
in the fields of Foreign and Security Policy.'67
The goal of clarity led the Convention to set out several Arti-
cles early in the Constitution on exclusive and shared compe-
tences. Relatively few exclusive Union competences are recog-
nized, notably the customs union, the Common Commercial
Policy, competition rules for the internal market, and monetary
policy within the Eurozone States (Article 1-12).168 Article 1-13
provides a fairly long list of shared competence fields. Tradi-
tional fields are listed - internal market, agriculture and fisher-
ies, transport, social policy, environment, and consumer protec-
tion.1 69 Interesting additions are the area of freedom, security
and justice and common safety concerns in public health mat-
ters. In areas of exclusive competence of the Union, Member
States may act only if "empowered by the Union" or in imple-
menting Union acts (Article 1-11). 7° In an area of shared com-
petence, the priority is given to Union action: Member States
may act only if the Union has not exercised its competence.
The Constitution sets out initially some other fundamental
163. O.J. C 169/1, at 17 (July 18, 2003).
164. o.J. C 169/1, at 1I (July 18, 2003).
165. O.J. C 169/1, at 18 (July 18, 2003).
166. Id.
167. o.J. C 169/1, at 9 (July 18, 2003).
168. o.J. C 169/1, at 10 (july 18, 2003).
169. oJ. C 169/1, at 11 (July 18, 2003).
170. OJ. C 169/1, at 10 (July 18, 2003).
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principles. In Article 1-9, it states that the "Union competences
are governed by the principle of conferral," i.e., an enumerated
powers approach. 171 Expressly stated is that "l[c] ompetences not
conferred upon the Union in the Constitution remain with the
Member States."'1 72 The well-known principles of subsidiarity
and proportionality are also set forth in Article 1-9.
One controversial addition in the Constitution is Article I-
10's statement that the Constitution and Union law within its
competences have "primacy over the law of the Member
States." 7 ' In view of the long-standing Court of Justice doctrine
to this effect, and the acceptance of the principle of primacy by
new Member States every time each has joined, one would not
consider this so controversial, but media reaction in the U.K.
and elsewhere has often been aggressively hostile. The Article
may become an issue in Germany and Italy in view of their Con-
stitutional Courts' long-standing concern with the primacy doc-
trine in the sector of basic rights and with regard to the federal
structure of Germany.
The Constitution does not modify the current structure of
legal acts, but Article 1-32 does rename the legislative instru-
ments: the term "law" will replace "regulation" and "framework
law" will replace "directive."' 74 At least in English this brings
greater clarity to the status of each type of legislation.
Article 1-33 sets out the mode of co-decision,175 defined in
Article III-302,176 as the customary form of adopting legislation.
In Part III of the Constitution, which deals with policies and
fields of action, a number of legislative fields will be converted
from the consultation of Parliament to co-decision. Probably the
most important of these is agriculture - under Article 111-127,
the market organization rules will be set by the usual co-decision
procedure (although 111-127(3) authorizes the Council acting
alone, on a proposal from the Commission, to adopt the acces-
sory regulations or decisions on "fixing prices, levies, aid and
quantitative limitations"). 177 However, Article 1-33 also permits
171. OJ. C 169/1, at 10 (July 18, 2003).
172. Art. 1-9(2), O.J. C 169/1, at 10 (July 18, 2003).
173. 0J. C 169/1, at 10 (July 18, 2003).
174. oJ. C 169/1, at 16 (July 18, 2003).
175. 0J. C 169/1, at 16 (July 18, 2003).
176. OJ. C 169/1, at 84-85 (July 18, 2003).
177. oJ. C 169/1, at 52 (July 18, 2003).
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"special legislative procedures" which will continue to apply in
numerous still sensitive fields. 178 Thus, Parliament will still only
be consulted in the setting of competition rules (Article III-
52), 9 legislation and decisions concerning monetary affairs
(e.g., in the selection of Central Bank Executive Board mem-
bers, Article 111-84),18o and in the harmonization of internal taxa-
tion rules (Article III-62).181
The Constitution commences with the declaration that the
Union will respect the fundamental values of "human dignity,
liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for
human rights" (Article 1-2).182 Later it indicates that the Union
will "observe the principle of the equality of citizens" (Article I-
44),183 be "founded on the principle of representative democ-
racy" (Article 1-45),"8 as well as that of "participatory democ-
racy" (Article 1-46).5 The Constitution continues the impor-
tant obligation that all Member States be democracies respecting
the values in Article 1-2, and sets out mechanisms for penalties
for a violation of this (Article 1-58)."16 A novel addition is the
power granted to a Member State in Article 1-59 to withdraw vol-
untarily from the Union, under a framework procedure. 7
The Nice Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union has been incorporated into the Constitution as its Part II,
receiving Treaty force and providing legally-enforceable rights,
at least with regard to acts of the EU itself. The U.K. and several
other States criticized the creation of legally enforceable rights
during the Convention, but the approach was not seriously re-
examined during the IGC. Although it is hard to conceive of a
Constitution without a bill of rights, the incorporation of the
Charter without any change has led to some anomalies, such as
duplicate coverage of certain rights elsewhere in the Constitu-
tion. The courts may also have some difficulty in determining
178. O.J. C 169/1, at 16 (July 18, 2003).
179. o.J. C 169/1, at 36 (July 18, 2003).
180. o.J. C 169/1, at 43 (July 18, 2003).
181. oj. C 169/1, at 38 (July 18, 2003).
182. O.J. C 169/1, at 8 (July 18, 2003).
183. O.J. C 169/1, at 19 (July 18, 2003).
184. o.J. C 169/1, at 19 (July 18, 2003).
185. O.J. C 169/1, at 19-20 (July 18, 2003).
186. Oj. C 169/1, at 21-22 (July 18, 2003).
187. Oj. C 169/1, at 22 (July 18, 2003).
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which provisions of the Charter set out enforceable rights, and
which merely state desirable policy aspirations.
D. After the Draft Constitution
The optimism with which the Convention commenced work
was certainly greatly diminished by the slow progress in reaching
full accord on key text, and even more by the bitter character of
debates within and outside the Convention on central issues.
The manifestly poor relations among leading Member State
leaders as an unfortunate consequence of the division over the
Iraq war also may well have made it more difficult to reach com-
promises or settle controversial issues during the fall of 2003.
The media also indicated that Convention President Giscard
d'Estaing and the Presidium were criticized for failure to consult
adequately with the representatives of the parliaments and for
yielding on key issues to the desires of larger Member States. 188
The publication of the Convention's draft Constitution
launched an enlarged public debate about the nature and wis-
dom of its proposals. Its text has many influential admirers and
supporters, but there are also many severe critics, not just gov-
ernments concerned to protect their national interests. Thus
some academic critics contend that the draft text eliminates
terms with a substantive content provided by Court decisions in
favor of new, ambiguous or potentially uncertain terms. Moreo-
ver, it is debatable whether the new Constitution is that much
more comprehensible and acceptable to the public at large.
Public opinion polls in July 2003 indicated that only a relatively
small minority of the people in most States (usually around one-
quarter) were even aware that a draft Constitution had been pre-
pared.
The Intergovernmental Conference to review the draft Con-
stitution commenced on October 2nd and reported to the Brus-
sels European Council on December 12th. In view of the fact
that the ten applicant States would also need to ratify the Consti-
tution, the Thessalonica European Council decided that they
should be represented in the IGC along with the current Mem-
188. See, e.g., Quentin Peel, Don't Overlook the Small States, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2003,
at 15; Michael Prowse, A Strongman is not the Kind of Leader that Europe Needs, FIN. TIMES,
May 16-17, 2003, at 13.
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ber States. 8 ' The IGC devoted most of its time to a revision of
the draft text with a view to producing greater clarity, precision,
and legal certainty. The IGC's revised text, as presented to the
European Council, makes "editorial and legal adjustments" to
the language of many draft articles, occasionally even shifting
the place of articles, but does not modify the substance of the
draft Constitution. 90
Throughout the fall, the governments of the Member States
and the applicants debated a number of the key innovations of
the draft Constitution, gradually working toward a consensus on
some, but not on the most divisive issues. 9' The ministers of
foreign affairs met at a so-called conclave in Naples at the end of
November to examine some of the serious issues, making some
progress, but leaving the most difficult ones for resolution by the
Brussels European Council. 192
Unfortunately, the Brussels European Council of December
12-13, 2003 ended in a stalemate on the most bitterly debated
issue, that of the nature of the qualified majority vote in the
Council, as well as leaving certain other lesser issues un-
resolved.' 9 ' As we have seen, the compromise text of the Treaty
of Nice for Qualified Majority Voting gives Spain and Poland a
voting power measured in their weighted votes that is out of line
with their populations. (Each have twenty-seven weighted votes
in comparison to the twenty-nine allotted to the four largest
States, even though Germany's population is double that of
Spain and Poland, and that of France, Italy, and the U.K. is
about 50% greater). France and Germany insisted upon the
draft Constitution's formula for QMV which is based on a
double majority, i.e., a majority of all States plus a 60% majority
of the Union's population represented in the States favoring a
measure.194 Spain and Poland, supported by several smaller
189. E.U. BULL., no. 6, at 9 (2003).
190. CIG 50/03, available at http://ue.eu.int/igcpdf/en/03/cgOO/cgOO050-
adOlcoO2.en03.pdf (Dec. 8, 2003).
191. See George Parker, Italy Confident of Progress on EU Constitution, FIN. TIMES, Nov.
25, 2003, at 5.
192. See George Parker, Hopes Rise for Deal on European Constitution FIN. TIMES, Dec.
1, 2003, at 2.
193. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. See also John Tagliabue, European
Union Leaders Fail to Agree on a Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2003, at Al.
194. See, e.g., George Parker, Leaders Know Size Does Matter as Another EU Summit
Looms, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2003, at 3.
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States, firmly rejected the new text, demanding a retention of
the Nice approach. 195 Prime Minister Berlusconi of Italy, chair-
ing the session, sought to find a compromise solution, but in
vain.
The second issue keenly debated all fall was whether all
States should receive a voting member of the Commission. Led
by Finland and Poland, virtually all the smaller nations opposed
the draft Constitution's approach, which would introduce a sys-
tem of equal rotation of membership, so that the Commission
could be composed of only fifteen members. 19 6 The Commis-
sion itself, in its Opinion to the IGC, urged the retention of a
larger Commission composed of one Commissioner from each
Member State.' 9 7 In September, President Prodi proposed a re-
structuring of Commission operations into departments, each to
be headed by a senior Commissioner, with other Commissioners
working in a "mini-cabinet."'98 The idea met with considerable
support. Media reports indicated that during the fall the gov-
ernments moved toward the idea of a Commission composed of
one voting Commissioner for each State, even though this would
mean a Commission of twenty-five or more Members. Indeed,
some suggestions were voiced that the five largest States (or six,
with Poland) might regain their second Commissioner. 9
Another unresolved issue concerned the draft Constitu-
tion's proposed shift to QMV voting in several key areas (tax leg-
islation, immigration and asylum rules, and foreign affairs policy
decisions). Prime Minister Blair, with some support from other
governments, sought to retain the principle of unanimity. Ap-
parently, the Brussels European Council in oral discussion
moved toward that position, but no final decisions were
reached.2 0 0
After the failure of the European Council to approve the
195. See, eg., George Parker, Poles say Planned EU Voting Rules may Create 'Unipolar-
ity" FIN. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2003, at 4.
196. See, e.g., Nicholas George, Finn gives Voice to the Fears of EUs Small States, FIN.
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2003, at 5.
197. E.U. BULL., no. 9, at 8 (2003).
198. See George Parker, Prodi Wins Praise for Plan to Streamline EU Government, FIN.
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2003, at 6.
199. See Bertrand Benoit, Germany Hints at EU Constitution Compromise, FIN. TIMES,
Oct. 7, 2003, at 4.
200. See George Parker, Ahern Keen to Revise EU Constitutional Talks, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
9, 2004, at 2.
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draft Constitution, the next step is uncertain. Prime Minister
Ahern of Ireland declared that his Council presidency would at-
tempt to use quiet diplomacy to try to resolve the open issues.2" 1
Unfortunately, this spring the political leadership of the
Union must confront another difficult and divisive issue: the
Union overall budget and revenue limits for the 2007-12 period.
France, Germany, the U.K., Austria, the Netherlands and Swe-
den, all States that contribute more in revenues than they re-
ceive, declared in a joint statement on December 15, 2003 that
they wanted the Union budget essentially frozen during the
2007-12 period to a revenue level of 1% of the Union gross na-
tional income.20 2 The Commission naturally desires a substan-
tial increase in Union revenues and expenditures. Also natu-
rally, Poland and the other Central European applicants support
a budget increase that would enable them to receive various
types of financial assistance, a view supported by Spain, which
has in the past received substantial Cohesion Fund and other
assistance. The debate on this issue this spring promises to be
extremely difficult.
Following this debate will come the June elections for Par-
liament and then the process of selecting the next Commission
President and a new 2004-09 Commission. Most observers ac-
cordingly believe that serious discussion about the draft Consti-
tution can only take place in the fall under the Dutch presi-
dency, or that it may perhaps be deferred until the Luxembourg
presidency in early 2005.
CONCLUSION
The history of the European Union (and previously that of
the European Community) is continuously marked by dramatic
advances, but often equally dramatic set-backs. The year 2003
exemplifies both.
The entry into force, a bit belatedly, of the Treaty of Nice is
certainly a significant success for the future operational health of
the Union. Critics may not consider the Nice Treaty institu-
tional provisions to constitute a dramatic success, but many of
them represent excellent approaches, notably those on the judi-
201. Id.
202. See George Parker, Europe Big Six Call for Freeze on EU Budget, FIN. TIMES, Dec.
16, 2003, at 4.
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cial architecture of the Union. Even the provisions that are obvi-
ous compromises, such as the handling of Qualified Majority
Voting in the Council, do permit the decision-making to go for-
ward fairly well.
The conclusion of the enlargement process with the signing
of the Treaty of Athens is a dramatic and long awaited develop-
ment. Although no one can deny that the adjustment to living
in the European Union will pose challenges and difficulties for
the new States, this is still a dream come true, particularly for
those who lived so long under Communist hegemony. The EU
as a whole will gain immeasurably from the cultural and social
contributions that the new States will provide, as well as benefit-
ing economically over the long term.
Finally, the draft Constitution, if ever adopted, will radically
change the Union in many ways. Not all aspects of the Constitu-
tion will meet universal favor, and some may even prove less
than functionally desirable, but the very fact of the Constitution
will promote the sense of common citizenship in a new Europe.
In the current acrimonious debate between Member State lead-
ers, predictions are hazardous - but it does seem likely that one
way or another, the leaders of the Union will find a way to re-
solve their differences and achieve a Constitution for Europe.
